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WAGGING, NOT BARKING: STATUTORY
DEFINITIONS
JEANNE FRAZIER PRICE*
ABSTRACT
Legislative text is distinguished by the frequency with which it specifies the
meaning of the words it employs. More than 25,000 terms are defined in the United
States Code alone. In few other contexts is there a perceived need to so carefully
and repeatedly clarify meaning. This Article examines the roles played by
definitions in a reader's understanding and application of a legislative text; it
demonstrates that the effects of defining are not as straightforward as we might
assume. The discussion is framed by the distinction between legislation as a
communication vehicle and as an instrument of governance. In some cases,
definition serves predominantly a communicative purpose; it clarifies the speaker's
intent. But at other times the legislative definition empowers; it serves a
performative function, investing groups of individuals or instances with rights or
obligations. The Article suggests that a better understanding of the effect of
definition on a reader's interaction with a text, coupled with an appreciation of the
different roles served by definition, will enable legislators to draft more useful
definitions and enable interpreters to better apply those definitions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
More than 25,000 definitions nestle quietly within the fifty-one titles of the
United States Code.' The variety of those definitions defies expectations. The
meanings of nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs and even prepositional phrases are
described, sometimes by lengthy and nearly impossibly complicated texts and at
other times by one- or two-word synonyms.a Single words are defined, as are
compound words and simple and complex phrases.3
Although practitioners and academics routinely interact with statutory
definitions, there has been little discussion of the functions served by those
definitions or of their utility.4 We seem to accept the existence and even the
1 Definitions in the United States Code were counted over a seventeen month period,
beginning in April 2011 and ending in August 2012. Any word or phrase defined in a U.S.
Code section titled "definitions" was counted, as well as definitions of terms that appeared
outside of explicitly designated definition sections. Terms are usually defined using the verbs
"means," "is," and "includes." Since many words and phrases are defined (differently)
multiple times throughout the U.S. Code (e.g., child, commerce, employee, person, sale,
state), the number of unique terms defined in the Code is significantly smaller.
2 Nouns as varied as "citizen" (43 U.S.C.A. § 177 (West 2012)), "dam" (25 U.S.C.A. §
3802 (West 2012)), "drug" (15 U.S.C.A. § 55 (West 2012)), "facility" (14 U.S.C.A. § 690
(West 2012)), "hostilities" (10 U.S.C.A. § 948a (West 2012)), "insider" (11 U.S.C.A. § 101(West 2012)), "maquiladora" (6 U.S.C.A. § 1401 (West 2012)), "propeller" (18 U.S.C.A. § 31
(West 2012)), "put," (7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2012)), and "vessel" (17 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (West
2012)) are defined in the U.S. Code. Verbs defined in the Code include "buy" (15 U.S.C.A. §
78c (West 2012)), "debar" (10 U.S.C.A. § 2393 (West 2012)), "intimidate" (18 U.S.C.A. §
248 (West 2012)), and "subscribe" (17 U.S.C.A. § 111 (West 2012)). Other Code sections
define adjectives (e.g., "eligible" in 5 U.S.C.A. § 4701 (West 2012), "credentialed" in 6
U.S.C.A. § 311 (West 2012), and "available" in 17 U.S.C.A. § 119 (West 2012)), adverbs
(e.g., "publicly" in 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012)), and prepositional phrases (e.g., "below
the mean high water line" in 19 U.S.C.A. § 1773b (West 2012) and "without regard to waste"
in 25 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (West 2012)).
3 Among the more colorful phrases defined in the U.S. Code are "simplified acquisitions
threshold definitions" (6 U.S.C.A. § 423 (West 2012)), "emergency situation involving a
biological or chemical weapon of mass destruction" (15 U.S.C.A. § 382 (West 2012)), and
"grave breach of common Article 3" (18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2012)).
4 For all their ubiquity, statutory definitions remain relatively unexamined by legal
scholarship. Legislative drafting manuals pay relatively short shrift to the statutory definition.
E.g., M. DOUGLASS BELLIS, STATUTORY STRUCTURE AND LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING
CONVENTIONS: A PRIMER FOR JUDGES (2008), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/draftcon.pdf/$file/draftcon.pdf; REED DICKERSON,
LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING (1954); REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING
(2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter DICKERSON, FUNDAMENTALS]; TOBIAS A. DORSEY, LEGISLATIVE
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necessity of statutory definition with little introspection; we have not closely
examined the consequences, either expected or unintended, of definitions and their
impact, conscious or not, on a reader's understanding of a text.
Too many commentators have written on the "messiness"5 of legislation, its
"monstrous" complexity,6 and its lack of "meaningful transparency."7  To what
extent do definitions mitigate that complexity and incomprehensibility, or do
statutory definitions in fact contribute to it? Given the length and specificity of
many statutory definitions, it is easy to assume that the meanings of those defined
terms are well-settled-at least in that statutory context 8. But the frequency of
litigation around the application of legislative definitions belies that assumption.
Within the last few years alone, the United States Supreme Court has on many
occasions considered the scope and application of terms seemingly well defined by
federal statute.9 Lower courts even more frequently wrestle with the meaning and
application of legislative definitions."°
DRAFTER'S DESKBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (2006); LAWRENCE E. FILSON & SANDRA L.
STROCKOFF, THE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER'S DESK REFERENCE (2d ed. 2008); DONALD HIRSCH,
DRAFTING FEDERAL LAW (2d ed. 1989); and WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS
AND DRAFTING (2d ed. 1984). These and similar manuals may suggest the location of
definitions within bills, particular methods of definition, or even specific verbiage to be
employed in legislative definitions, but they do little to add to an understanding of the
purposes and functions-let alone the utility-of statutory definitions.
5 See generally Editors'Note on "Legisprudence," 89 B.U. L. REV. 423 (2009).
6 Robert Pear, If Only Laws were like Sausages, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, at WK3, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/weekinreview/05pear.html?_rl&ref=today spaper.
7 See generally Jane S. Schacter, Digitally Democratizing Congress? Technology and
Political Accountability, 89 B. U. L. REv. 641 (2009).
8 "Detailed definitions give the impression that legal language is entirely accurate and
without ambiguity. This is not the case." HEIKKI E. S. MATTILA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL
LINGUISTICS 70 (Christopher Goddard trans., 2006).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010), in which the Court
considered the definition of "depiction of animal cruelty" set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 48(c)(1)
(West 2012); Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012), in which the "sparse" definition of
"child" set forth in section 416(e) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 416(e) (West
2012)) is discussed; Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct 1265 (2010), in which the meaning of
the term "physical force," as used in the definition of "violent felony" in 18 U.S.C.A. §
924(e)(1) (West 2012), is debated; Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States, 130 S. Ct.
1324 (2010), which held that attorneys may indeed be "debt relief agencies" as defined in 11
U.S.C.A. § 101(12A) (West 2012); Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 1166 (2012), where the
Court looked at the definition of "aggravated felony" set forth in 26 U.S.C.A. § 7206 (West
2012); Samantar v. Yousef, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2011), a case which turned on whether an
individual could be included within the definition of "foreign state" set forth in 28 U.S.C.A. §
1603 (West 2012); McNeil v. United States,131 S. Ct. 2218 (2011), in which the meaning of
the term "serious drug offense," as defined in 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (West 2012)
rests upon the tense of the verbs used in the definition; and Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130
S .Ct. 2577 (2010), which again considers the meaning of the term "aggravated felony," this
time in an immigration context and as defined in 8 U.S.C.A. 1101 § (a)(43)(B) (West 2012).
10 Recent lower court decisions involving the interpretation of definitions set forth in the
U.S. Code include United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 627 F.3d
64 (2d Cir. 2010) (definitions of "performance" and "publicity" in the Copy Right Act, 17
2013]
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In his book, The Language of Statutes, Lawrence Solan focuses on "the dogs that
do not bark-the aspects of lawmaking that appear to present very little problem and
that, therefore, make it possible for us to govern ourselves more or less successfully
in a complex legal system based on finely articulated rules."" One of Solan's
chapters is titled "Definitions, Ordinary Meaning, and Respect for the Legislature."
Solan's focus in that chapter is on the meaning-ordinary or not-of words in a
statutory text.
My focus is narrower. This Article explores the role that definitions incorporated
into a statute play in our understanding and application of the text. I suggest that this
role is a much more substantive and important one than we acknowledge. Although
statutory definitions may not bark-they do not bring attention to themselves-they
often act as the tail that wags the dog. They are important thresholds to our
understanding of and the success of legislation. Statutory definitions are not
normative (another reason that they do not bark). Instead, they confer the authority
U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Sprint Commc'n v. Ntelos Tel. Inc., No. 5:1 1cv00082, 2012 WL
3065437 (W.D. Va. July 26, 2012) (definition of "claim" in the Bankruptcy Code, I I U.S.C. §
101(5) (2006)); Sec. Investor Pro. Corp. v. Jacqueline Green Rollover Account, No. 12 Civ.
1039(DLC), 2012 WL 3042986 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2012) (definition of "customer" under the
Securities Investor Protections Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78111(2) (2006)), McCorkle v. Bank
of Am. Corp., 688 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 2012) (definition of "normal retirement age" under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(24) (West 2012));
and Alamo v ABC Fin. Serv., Inc., No. 09 5686, 2011 WL 221766 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2011)(definition of "debt collector" under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §
1692a(6) (West 2012)).
Arista Records v. LaunchMedia, 578 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2009) illustrates some of the ironies
inherent in courts' efforts to clarify the meaning of a definition. 17 U.S.C.A. § 114 (West
2012) defines an "interactive service," in part, as "one that enables a member of the public to
receive a transmission of a program specially created for the recipient, or on request, a
transmission of a particular sound recording, whether or not as part of a program, which is
selected by or on behalf of the recipient." In its struggle to determine whether the services
offered by LaunchMedia qualified as interactive ones, the Second Circuit felt compelled to
consult Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary to ascertain the meaning of both "specially"
and "created." Although the court ultimately found the dictionary to be of little use, the
court's willingness to parse the meaning of a definition by, as a first resort, referring to
dictionary definitions of the words used in the statutory definition says something about the
utility of definitions in general
Finally, deserving special mention is the 2011 case of the inebriated cowboys. Two individuals,
while intoxicated, rode, respectively, a mule and a horse in downtown Austin, Texas. See John
Kelso, Commentary, Vodka and Cranberry on a Mule Shows Just How Much Austin has
Changed, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, June 13, 2011, available at http://www.statesman.com/news/
local/vodka-and-cranberry-on-a-mule-shows-just 1184146.html. One of the two was arrested and
charged with driving while intoxicated. The charges were subsequently dropped. The state statue
contemplates the use of a motor vehicle in cases involving a charge of driving while intoxicated
(Thx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (West 2011)); the Texas definition of motor vehicle, however,
hardly eliminates vehicles of the four-legged variety. "'Motor vehicle' means a device in, on, or
by which a person or property is or may be transported or drawn on a highway, except a device
used exclusively on stationary rails or tracks." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 49.01 (3) and 32.34 (2)(West 2011).
i LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION
13 (2010).
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and establish a structure that allows the statute's normative provisions to have effect;
they inform and instruct as to how a particular outcome might be achieved or
avoided.
If statutory definitions do in fact serve important legislative functions and affect
the balance of power between legislators and interpreters, we ought to know more
about them. Examining the statutory definition in depth may lead to more nuanced
and mindful drafting of definitions and to better informed interpretations. By
understanding what definitions accomplish-or purport to accomplish-and how
they affect cognition, we may be in a better position to determine when definitions
are appropriately included in legislation and how best to formulate those definitional
texts. We may also find that defining terms-or defining terms in particular ways-
may not always serve clarity, consistency, or comprehensibility; in some situations,
no definition may be the better plan.
The Article explores four facets of statutory definition: (i) the type of word or
phrase defined; (ii) the technique by which the term is defined; (iii) the purpose of
definition; and (iv) the effects of definition. The Article concludes by making some
suggestions about the drafting of statutory definitions generally and about some
particular considerations that legislators and drafters might keep in mind as they
decide whether terms used in statutes warrant definition. Particular definition
techniques may serve some purposes better than others. Moreover, if interpreters of
legislation better understand how definitions function within a statutory scheme,
they, in turn, may be better equipped to construe them in a way that furthers the
statutory purpose.
Framing this discussion of statutory definition is the distinction between
legislation-and its component definitions-as instruments of governance and as
communication vehicles. 2 Since J. L. Austin first described the role played by what
he termed "performative utterances" or "speech acts," their relevance and application
to law have been clear, albeit not always well or consistently articulated.13 Thinking
12 Yon Malley characterizes a statute as "an act of language and an act of law." Yon
Malley, The Language of Legislation, 16 LANGUAGE IN Soc'Y, 25, 28 (2010). And, Reed
Dickerson, in advising legislative drafters, points out that too often they fail to realize that "a
legal instrument is both (1) a crystallization and declaration of rights, privileges, duties, and
legal relationships and (2) a communication." DICKERSON, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 4, at
25.
13 j. L. Austin described a particular type of speech that (i) does not 'describe' or 'report'
or constate anything at all"; (ii) is not true or false; and (iii) "is, or is a part of, the doing of an
action, which ... would not normally be described as saying something." He went on to
provide four examples of this type of speech: (i) "I do," in a marriage ceremony; (ii) "I name
this ship the Queen Elizabeth;" (iii) "I give and bequeath my watch to my brother;" and (iv) "I
bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow." "In these examples it seems clear that to utter the
sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing of what I
should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it." J. L.
AUSTIN, How TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 5-6 (1962). Austin coined the term "performative
sentence" to represent these kinds of speech.
In applying the concept of performative sentences or speech acts, as John Searle characterized
them (JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969)),
Yon Maley suggests that all legislation in fact serves the performative function: "When the
legislature enacts a statute, it is performing speech acts in the classic, performative Austinian
sense." Maley, supra note 12, at 27. Monica Cowart looks at consent through a speech act
analysis; she finds that speech act theory "offers a systematic approach for uncovering the
10032013]
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about statutory definitions as having both communicative functions and
governance-or speech act-functions should allow us to see that sometimes the
communicative function is the more important and is more closely related to the
definition's purpose. In other cases, it is the role played by the definition as a speech
act-i.e., an instrument of governance-that motivates its inclusion. To the extent
that we can determine why a definition is incorporated in a statute-and what
purposes it serves-we can draft better definitions that further the interests of
communication and / or governance.
II. TYPES OF TERMS DEFINED
Terms defined in statutes could be categorized in any number of ways. Terms
that are discipline-specific might be compared to those that are used in everyday
language; definitions of physical objects and recognized phenomena that occur in the
world might be contrasted with definitions that relate to abstractions or
characteristics. The soul of definition relates to meaning; whether or not a definition
is necessary or advisable depends on the audience's understanding--or lack of
understanding--of the term absent the definition. But the legislative audience is not
homogenous. Legislation effects consequences; it "carries meaning"'4 independent
of any one individual's understanding of the meaning of its terms. How and whether
terms are defined in statutory text ought to relate in some way to the meaning-if
any- of the term outside of the statute.
Terms defined by statute might be roughly grouped as follows:
A. Terms that in ordinary use have many-sometimes inconsistent or
contradictory-meanings
1. Ordinary, frequently used words and phrases
2. Ambiguous terms
B. Terms that have almost no meaning absent definition
1. Terms that have some (but very little) sense in context
2. Terms having no sense
C. Terms associated with well-established and either ordinary or
discipline-specific meaning
1. Common words and phrases
2. Descriptive phrases
3. Terms of art and technical terms
It is easy to intuit that terms falling within categories A and B might, at least
absent a context, require definition. Less obvious is a decision to define terms that
fall within category C. Yet all of these types of words and phrases are defined
complex relationship between uttering words and what one does by uttering them." Monica
Cowart, Understanding Acts of Consent: Using Speech Act Theory to Help Resolve Moral
Dilemmas and Legal Disputes, 23 LAW & PI-fnLOsoPHY 495,496-97 (2004).
14 Timothy Endicott, Linguistic Indeterminacy, 16 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 667, 683
(1996) (quoting FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 207 (1991)). Endicott discusses
at some length Schauer's notion of "semantic autonomy" and the suggestion that symbols (and
Schauer includes in that term individual words and phrases) can "carry meaning independent
of the communicative goals on particular occasions of the users of those symbols." While
Schauer argues that speakers of a common language can understand one another even if they
have "nothing in common but their language," Endicott suggests that there no such language
speakers who share a language and yet nothing else. Id. at 684.
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repeatedly and inconsistently (in fact, often contradictorily) throughout the U.S.
Code.
A. Ordinary Terms with Many Meanings
Terms defined in the United State Code include commonly used words whose
meaning ordinarily depends on context and the expertise of the communicants.
"Available," "bank," "child," "delivery," "educator," "function," "livestock,"
"machine," "operator," "records," "repair," "security," "value," and "vessel," are all
words that signify different things to different people in different circumstances, and
all are terms defined on multiple occasions in the United States Code. 5 Sometimes
those definitions clarify what sense of the word is intended, and place limits on the
term's application for purposes of the statute. For example, the definition of
"traffic" in Title 18's prohibition of trafficking in stolen goods sets forth activities
that qualify as trafficking and imposes the requirement that those activities be
undertaken for "commercial advantage or private gain" in order to fall within the
definition's scope. 6 But other definitions of familiar but context-dependent terms
15 "Available" is defined in 17 U.S.C.A. § 119 (West 2012) and 47 U.S.C.A. § 339 (West
2012); "bank" is defined in 7 U.S.C.A. § 27 (West 2012), 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 36, 202, 461, 635t,
1422, 1841, 2214a, 2282, 5002 (West 2012), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77c, 78c, 80a-2, 80b-2 (West
2012), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113 (West 2012), 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 262r-6, 2185 (West 2012), and 26
U.S.C.A. §§ 408, 581, 585 (West 2012); "child" is defined in 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 5569, 8101, 8341,
8345, 8441, 8467 (West 2012), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (West 2012), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1707 (West
2012), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6501 (West 2012), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1111, 1169, 1204, 3509 (West 2012),
20 U.S.C.A. §§ 7011, 7801 (West 2012), 22 U.S.C.A. § 4044 (West 2012), 25 U.S.C.A. §
3202 (West 2012), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 151, 152 (West 2012), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 376, 1738A, 1738B
(West 2012), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1169 (West 2012), 30 U.S.C.A. § 902 (West 2012), 38 U.S.C.A.
§§ 101, 1831, 1901, 1965 (West 2012), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 290ff-4, 416, 675, 1382c, 1396a,
1396r-la, 1397jj, 3030s, 3796b, 3796aa-8, 5011, 5106g, 5119c, 5792, 13791, 13882 (West
2012), and 50 U.S.C.A. § 2002 (West 2012); "delivery" is defined in 21 U.S.C.A. § 802 (West
2012) and 44 U.S.C.A. § 3601 (West 2012); "educator" is defined in 25 U.S.C.A. § 2012
(West 2012); "function" is defined in 22 U.S.C.A. § 6502 (West 2012), 29 U.S.C.A. § 2918a
(West 2012), and 42 U.S.C.A. §12651, 12651d (West 2012); "livestock" is defined in 7
U.S.C.A. §§ 182, 1471, 1472, 1523, 1635a, 8302 (West 2012), 16 U.S.C.A. § 3801 (West
2012), and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2311 (West 2012); "machine" is defined in 17 U.S.C.A. § 101
(West 2012); "operator" is defined in 16 U.S.C.A. § 973 (West 2012), 29 U.S.C.A. § 2882
(West 2012), 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 802, 1702 (West 2012), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1901 (West 2012), 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2014, 6991 (West 2012), and 49 U.S.C.A. § 30501 (West 2012); "records" are
defined in 10 U.S.C.A. § 2313 (West 2012), 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390 (West 2012), 15 U.S.C.A. §§
78c, 78x (West 2012), 41 U.S.C.A. § 254d (West 2012), and 44 U.S.C.A. § 3301 (West 2012);
"repair" is defined in 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-21 (West 2012) and 49 U.S.C.A. § 32702 (West
2012); "security" is defined in 7 U.S.C.A. § la (West 2012), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77b, 78c, 78111,
80a-2, 80b-2 (West 2012), 16 U.S.C.A. § 796 (West 2012), 18 U.S.C.A. § 513 (West 2012),
and 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 165, 475, 1042, 1236, 6323 (West 2012); "value" is defined in 11
U.S.C.A. §§ 522, 548 (West 2012), 12 U.S.C.A. 5390 (West 2012), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 641,2311
(West 2012), 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2321h, 2403,2794 (West 2012), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 382, 851, 856,
4462 (West 2012), and 50 U.S.C.A. § 415 (West 2012); and "vessel" is defined in 10
U.S.C.A. § 7291 (West 2012), 16 U.S.C.A. § 973 (West 2012), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2311 (West
2012), 22 U.S.C.A. § 456 (West 2012), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 902, 1321, 1502, 1601, 2701 (West
2012), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (West 2012), 46 U.S.C.A. § 53701 (West 2012), and 49 U.S.C.A.
§§ 13102, 80301 (West 2012).
16 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 (West 2012).
10052013]
CLEVELAND STATE LA WREVIEW
impose unexpected restrictions on the scope of word meaning. In the context of
Title 42, in sections that address the safety of public water systems, the word
"repair" means "with respect to a drinking water cooler, to take such corrective
action as is necessary to ensure that water cooler is lead-free.' ' 7
Ambiguous terms similarly call for definition. These terms do not necessarily
occur in ordinary usage; they may or may not be descriptive; and their application
could extend to a variety of referents. "Architectural work," "financial entity,"
"foreign proceeding," "Indian custodian," "powers of self-government," and "small
business case"'--each of which is defined in the U.S. Code- could each be
associated with any number of objects; although many of those referents might have
some relationship to one other, they are often fundamentally different things. For
example, "architectural work" might refer to buildings, plans of buildings, sculpture,
or models. But its definition in the U. S. Code restricts that term's meaning to "the
design of a building"'9 [emphasis added]; the definition notes that the design may be
embodied in different media. Similarly, entities as diverse in purpose and function
as banks, accounting firms, collection agencies, tax preparers, ratings agencies, and
securities exchanges might all be collected within the scope of "financial entity."
Per the U.S. Code, that term includes individuals and entities engaged in particular
types of activities, as well as anyone "predominantly engaged in activities that are in
the business of banking or financial in nature."" °
If a term suggests multiple meanings, it has no unique referent or group of
referents in the real world.2' Terms with multiple meanings may be abstractions-
like "right of possession," "traffic," or "asset" 22 -a that represent concepts familiar
'7 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-21(West 2012).
18 "Architectural work" is defined in 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012); "financial entity" is
defined in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c-3 (West 2012); "foreign proceeding" is defined in 11 U.S.C.A. §
101 (West 2012); "Indian custodian" is defined in 25 U.S.C.A. § 1903 (West 2012); "powers
of self-government" is defined in 25 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (West 2012); and "small business case"
is defined in 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012).
'9 Per 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012), "architectural work" refers to "the design of a
building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building,
architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the overall form as well as the
arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include
individual standard features."
2 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c-3 (West 2012): "For the purposes of this subsection, the term
'financial entity' means--(i) a swap dealer; (ii) a security-based swap dealer; (iii) a major
swap participant; (iv) a major security-based swap participant; (v) a commodity pool as
defined in section la(10) of Title 7; (vi) a private fund as defined in section 80b-2(a) of this
title; (vii) an employee benefit plan as defined in paragraphs (3) and (32) of section 1002 of
Title 29; (viii) a person predominantly engaged in activities that are in the business of banking
or financial in nature, as defined in section 1843(k) of Title 12."
21 Rebecca Kukla, Cognitive Models and Representation, 43 THE BRIT. J. FOR THE PHIL. OF
Sci. 219, 221 (1992). "According to the covariance theory, representations get their meaning
by actually covarying with the things or states they represent in the real world." Id. If the
group of things with which a word "covaries" is not homogenous, the word has multiple
meanings. Id.
22 "Right of possession" is defined in 25 U.S.C.A. § 3001 (West 2012); "traffic" is defined
in 17 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (West 2012) and 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1028, 1029, 2318, 2319A, 2320 (West
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to us in an almost infinite variety of applications and contexts. The job of the
definition is to help us select which of the many possibilities applies. Other terms
with multiple meanings may function as symbols, collecting under one caption many
iterations of a type of thing, a grouping of somehow "like" things. Words and
phrases such as "state," "member bank," and "foreign proceeding"
23 represent, in
shorthand form, a collection of entities and events that can somehow be included
within a single term's compass. If law is a "system of signs,"
24 definitions of these
place-filling terms serve to point to a group of objects too numerous to otherwise
name.
Finally, many terms of multiple meaning function as descriptors, representing
groups of real world referents that share well-recognized characteristics. "Child,"
"employee," "forest product," and "academic facilities"25 might each relate to many
referents, but those terms describe members of a group that somehow resemble one
another. These indexical and descriptive terms may acquire meaning by "co-varying
with things in the real world,"26 but those things may still vary greatly among
themselves. What it is that brings them together in the context of the statute-what
matters for the statute's purposes-is often what the definition highlights.
B. Terms Having No Meaning
The second category of defined terms includes those that, standing alone, are
meaningless. Some of these terms-like "near elderly person," "excessive amount,"
2012); and "asset" is defined in 20 U.S.C.A. § 1087vv (West 2012), 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 677a, 26
U.S.C.A. 341, 806 (West 2012), and 28 U.S.C.A. § 3301 (West 2012).
23 "State" is probably one of the most frequently defined words in the U.S. Code. It often
includes each of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other territories or
possessions of the United States (e.g., 1 U.S.C.A. § 5707a, 6 U.S.C.A. § 1111 (West 2012), 7
U.S.C.A. § 1932 (West 2012), 10 U.S.C.A. § 2192 (West 2012), 12 U.S.C.A. § 95 (West
2012)). But it may also include Indian tribes and tribal organizations (42 U.S.C.A. § 629a
(West 2012)). Sometimes it refers to the State of California alone (16 U.S.C.A. §§ 460vvv,
539o, 13001-6, 1300m, 1300n-1 (West 2012)), and sometimes it expressly excludes Guam,
American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Marshall Islands, and
Palau (8 U.S.C.A. § 1522 (West 2012) and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3030s-1, 9835, 9872, 11841 (West
2012)). "Member bank" is defined in 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 656, 1005 (West 2012); "foreign
proceeding" is defined in 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012).
24 DENNIS R. KLINCK, THE WORD OF THE LAw 50 (1992) (citing Roberta Kevelson, who
characterizes law as "a sign system paralleling language").
25 "Child" and "employee" are both defined repeatedly in the U.S. Code: examples of
definitions of child are in 1 U.S.C.A. § 8 (West 2012), 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 5569, 8101, 8345, 8441,
8467 (West 2012). See also supra note 15. "Employee" is defined in, among other sections, 2
U.S.C.A. § 60e-ld, 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 130b, 1341, 1432, 1602 (West 2012), 4 U.S.C.A. § 401
(West 2012), and 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 2105, 3581, 4101, 4301, 4501, 4701, 5102, 5361, 5504, 5518,
5520a (West 2012). The term "forest product(s)" is defined in 25 U.S.C.A. § 3103(West
2012) and 46 U.S.C.A. § 40102 (West 2012). "Academic facilities" is referenced in 25
U.S.C.A. § 1813(f(2) (West 2012); that section states that the term has the meaning provided
in 20 U.S.C.A. § 1132e-1 (West 2012). Unfortunately, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1132e-1 (West 1980)
was omitted from the U.S. Code in 1986 when Chapter 28 of Title 20 was reorganized.
26 Kukla, supra note 21.
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"useful article," "incidental property" or "new hybrid product"27 -may make some
sense in particular contexts; otherwise, these are rudderless terms, signifying
nothing. Other terms are nearly nonsensical; "unresolved area of noncompliance,"
"identifying activity level," "qualified GO zone," and "master netting agreement," 8
are almost laughable. But, once defined by statute, these terms (in contrast to words
of ordinary usage, which acquire and shed shades of meaning as easily and often as
their contexts change) come to "carry their meaning like pieces of freight."2 9 They
are less likely to bend and sway to the winds of context.
For most of these sense-less terms, absent definition, there is no class of objects
or events that correspond to the term, and nothing that can be associated with, or
identified as belonging to, a class described by the term. We would be hard pressed
to pick out of a crowd all of the "reliance parties" or all of the "near elderly
persons."
C. Terms with Well-Established Meanings
There is no shortage of definitions in the U.S. Code of terms whose meanings are
well-established and uncontroversial. Words and phrases like "motion pictures,"
"emergency," and "margarine,"3 are well and similarly understood by most
speakers. Although we may not agree that particular situations could or should be
characterized as emergencies, we share a common appreciation of the prototypical
case of emergency, and we accept what it is about an event that makes it an
emergency. We generally disagree only at the fringes of meaning. Similarly, while
there are different types and formats of motion pictures, we all know what is meant
when we go to a motion picture or talk about making a motion picture. A term like
27 "Near elderly person" is defined in 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 4103, 1437a (West 2012);
"excessive amount" is defined in 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 6675, 6676 (West 2012); "useful article" isdefined in 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 102, 1301 (West 2012); "incidental property" is defined in 11U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012); and "new hybrid product" is defined in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o (West
2012).
28 "Unresolved area of noncompliance" is defined in 42 U.S.C.A. § 9832 (West 2012);
"identifying activity level" is defined in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West 2012); "qualified GO
zone" is defined in 26 U.S.C.A. § 1400N (West 2012); and "master netting agreement" is
defined in 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012).
29 James Boyd White, Thinking About Our Language, 96 YALE L.J. 1960, 1973 (1986).
Whether it is ever possible to precisely enumerate meaning through definition or descriptionhas been questioned. White has written at length about language and meaning in the context
of law. For him, "words are not discrete and definable entities, as much as our talk about
them (especially when we are thinking conceptually) seems to assume. They do not carry
their meanings like pieces of freight, which the competent reader can pick up perfectly, nor
are they reducible to ideas that can be regarded as having some existence beyond or behindlanguage." Id. But, definitions attempt to invest words with meaning and, so, to cause them
to become laden with a particular implication. While that may not be appropriate for
commonly understood terms, it makes much more sense for definitions of otherwise
nonsensical terms.
30 "Motion pictures" is defined in 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012); "emergency" is defined
in 7 U.S.C.A. § 1736f-1 (West 2012), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1187 (West 2012), 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(West 2012), 16 U.S.C.A. § 2206 (West 2012), and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5122, 5196, 8622 (West
2012); and "margarine" is defined in 15 U.S.C.A. § 55 (West 2012).
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"teaching skills," 3' also defined in the U.S. Code, similarly communicates something
that we all understand, but that we rarely have the need to precisely describe or
quantify.
Defining a well-understood word or phrase risks fixing its meaning in unintended
ways. Normal evolutions in word meaning are frustrated by definition. A definition
that might once have reliably reflected a well-accepted meaning comes to represent a
class of objects that does not correspond to a contemporary understanding of the
term. So, while we all understand what is meant when we talk about a motion
picture, defining it as an "audiovisual work consisting of a series of related images
which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion . . . ,3 may
trigger questions about the term's application as technologies evolve.
Descriptive phrases may also be relatively well understood, even absent
definition. "Burial site," "open dump," "heir by killing," "family violence," "drug-
related criminal activity," "housing area," and "foreign government' 3  all encompass
a variety of instances, yet most of us would easily be able to identify a particular
instance as a member of that category of things. Even with respect to a term as
charged as "weapons of mass destruction,""3 while there may be uncertainty in
application at the edge of meaning, prototypical members of that class of objects are
easily named. Many of these descriptive phrases correspond to real world objects or
events that we recognize as being appropriately classified within the scope of the
phrase.
Terms of art and technical terms are also associated with well-accepted meanings
by expert audiences, yet these phrases as well are often statutorily defined. In some
cases, these terms correspond to physical substances ("coal"), scientifically
recognized phenomena ("fetal alcohol syndrome" or "pneumoconiosis"), or
standards ("coordinated universal time").35 In other cases, events or iterations that
fall within a term's scope are characterized by particular attributes or functions,
characteristics that are familiar to actors within a particular discipline ("securities
self-regulatory organization"36).
31 "Teaching skills" is defined in 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021, 9812 (West 2012).
32 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012).
33 "Burial site" is defined in 25 U.S.C.A. § 3001 (West 2012); "open dump" is defined in
25 U.S.C.A. § 3902 (West 2012); "heir by killing" is defined in 25 U.S.C.A. § 2206 (West
2012); "family violence" is defined in 25 U.S.C.A. § 3202 (West 2012); "drug-related
criminal activity" is defined in 25 U.S.C.A. § 4103 (West 2012); "housing area" is defined in
25 U.S.C.A. § 4221 (West 2012); and "foreign government" is defined in 5 U.S.C.A. § 7342
(West 2012).
34 "Weapon of mass destruction" is defined in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332a(c)(2) (West 2012) and
50 U.S.C.A. § 2902 (West 2012).
35 "Coal" is defined in 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 48A, 48B (West 2012) and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 8302,
8374 (West 2012); "fetal alcohol syndrome" is defined in 25 U.S.C.A. § 1603 (West 2012);
"pneumoconiosis" is defined in 30 U.S.C.A. § 902 (West 2012); and "coordinated universal
time" is defined in 15 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 2012).
36 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012).
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III. METHODS OF DEFINITION
Techniques employed to define terms in the U.S. Code are almost as varied as
the terms themselves. Consider "livestock," a word that most of us are familiar with
and that is prototypically associated with cattle, sheep, goats, and similar animals
raised on a ranch or farm for commercial purposes. Sometimes the word is defined
by simply listing types of animals that fall within the term's scope. That list may be
exhaustive ("[t]he term 'livestock' means cattle, swine, and lambs"37) or merely
suggestive ("[t]he term 'livestock' includes, but is not limited to, cattle, sheep,
swine, goats, and poultry"38). Those definitions comport with our general
understanding of what is implied when the word 'livestock' is used.
Other definitions take a relatively common word-like "livestock"-and either
expand or limit its ordinary meaning in extraordinary ways. Other sections of the
U.S. Code establish meanings of "livestock" that include elk, reindeer, bison, horses,
deer, and "fish used for food," so long as instances of those animals meet two
additional conditions imposed by the definition.39 Other definitions of "livestock"
include dead animals (of particular species)4" and the carcasses of particular types of
animals, thereby expanding the word's scope beyond any ordinary understanding.4'
Sometimes, to define is to describe; still other definitions of "livestock" list
salient characteristics of instances included within the term's meaning. In other
sections of the Code, "livestock" consists of "all farm-raised animals"42 and "all
animals raised on farms."43  Those definitions clearly encompass prototypical
instances of livestock (e.g., cattle and sheep), and include outlying instances as well
(e.g., horses and even dogs and cats raised, for whatever purposes, on a farm).
Still other definitions establish conditions that must be met in order for the
definition to apply. One definition of "livestock" focuses on domestic animals, but
insists that they be raised for "home use, consumption, or profit."'
A. Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Definitions
Whatever mechanics are employed to define a term, the definitions that result
are, in approach, either descriptive or prescriptive.45 Descriptive definitions, not
3 7 U.S.C.A. § 1635a (West 2012).
387 U.S.C.A. § 1523 (West 2012).
'9 7 U.S.C.A. § 1471 (West 2012).
40 7 U.S.C.A. § 182 (West 2012): "The term 'livestock' means cattle, sheep, swine, horses,
mules, or goats-whether live or dead."
41 18 U.S.C.A. § 231 l(West 2012): "'Livestock' means any domestic animals raised for
home use, consumption, or profit, such as horses, pigs, llamas, goats, fowl, sheep, buffalo, and
cattle, or the carcasses thereof"
4' 7 U.S.C.A. § 8302 (West 2012).
41 16 U.S.C.A. § 3801 (West 2012).
44 18 U.S.C.A. § 2311 (West 2012).
45 Published in 1961, Webster's Third Unabridged Dictionary took an approach to
definitions that differed greatly from its predecessors. Dwight MacDonald, The String
Untuned, N. YORKER, at 177, Mar. 10, 1962 (reviewing WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) (3d ed. 1961)). Whereas the highly regarded Second Edition
1010 [Vol. 60:999
1011WAGGING, NOT BARKING
surprisingly, describe the meaning of a term. And, that description usually reflects
or depends upon the actual use of a word or phrase, although the definition itself
may enlarge or contract ordinary usage. Descriptive definitions paint a picture of the
term. According to its U.S. Code definition, a "swimming pool or spa" is "any
outdoor or indoor structure intended for swimming or recreational bathing, including
in-ground and above-ground structures, and includes hot-tubs, spas, portable spas
and non-portable wading pools."46  The definition describes what it is about
swimming pools that distinguishes them, without specifying in detail any required
attributes.
Descriptive definitions may be nominal in that they provide examples or
synonyms of the word defined, or denotative or extensional as they list components
or sub-classes of the defined term. The word "production" is defined nominally in
Title 19 as "growing, mining, harvesting, fishing, raising, trapping, hunting,
manufacturing, processing, assembling, or disassembling a good."
47  And, both
"nuclear science"4" and "weapons of mass destruction ' ' 9 are defined extensionally
by listing subsets of instances included within the broader defined term.
Descriptive definitions often depict either a cluster of attributes of what is
defined or typical uses of the term. Instances falling within the descriptive
definition's scope resemble one another because they share some, but often fewer
than all, enumerated characteristics. "Literary works," as defined in the U.S. Code,
"are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other
verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material
objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or
cards, in which they are embodied."50 That definition could encompass radically
different objects and instances-a love letter, a cartoon and its caption, a taxonomy,
an interview, a mathematical equation-but each of those instances share some
characteristics-they all fall within the common understanding of a "work," and they
all use characters of some sort to express something.
Descriptive definitions, then, create "fuzzy" categories
5
' of word meaning. They
may depend on the existence of a prototypical member of the category created by the
defined words in a classical way, i.e., prescriptively, by articulating the appropriate or correct
meaning and use of a word, Webster's Third defined words descriptively, by illustrating word
meaning by its use (correct or incorrect). Id.
46 15 U.S.C.A. § 8002 (West 2012).
47 "Production" is so defined on three occasions in Title 19: 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 3332, 3805,
4033 (West 2012).
48 42 U.S.C.A. § 16532 (West 2012): nuclear science "includes... (1) nuclear science; (2)
nuclear engineering; (3) nuclear chemistry; (4) radio chemistry; and (5) health physics."
49 50 U.S.C.A. § 2902 (West 2012): weapons of mass destruction are defined as any
"chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and chemical, biological, and nuclear materials
used in the manufacture of such weapons."
50 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012).
51 "Fuzzy" categories are those not defined by necessary and sufficient conditions.
Instead, fuzzy categories may relate to prototypical category members. The closer an instance
resembles the prototype, the more central it is to the category. With fuzzy categories, unlike
classical ones defined by necessary and sufficient conditions, an outlying instance's inclusion
in the category is not certain. See GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FiRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS:
20131
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term; the certainty with which instances are either included or excluded from the
term's scope depends on the closeness of their resemblance to the prototypical
instance. The boundaries of the definition are not rigidly established.
Prescriptive definitions, on the other hand, dictate the appropriate use of a term(at least as determined by the definition's author), one that may or may not
correspond to actual use, and one that is more definite and emphatic in its
application. Prescriptive definitions often enumerate at least one condition-a
universal-to which all instances of the defined term must conform. For purposes offederal personnel management, an employee is "an individual employed in or under
a federal agency."52 Although this definition does not provide much assistance inhelping us determine what it means to be employed generally, we know that for
purposes of the statute employment by a federal agency is required in order to satisfy
the definition.
Prescriptive definitions may consist of a set of conditions, compliance with each
one of which is necessary to fall within the definition's scope and beyond which
there are no other requirements. Instances are either clearly in or out of the
prescriptive definition's boundaries.
While "swimming pool or spa" is defined descriptively in the U.S. Code, thedefinition of a "public pool or spa" is a prescriptive one. The term "public pool and
spa" is defined to mean:
a swimming pool or spa that is:(A) open to the public generally, whether for a fee or free of charge;
(B) open exclusively to-
(i) members of an organization and their guests;(ii) residents of a multi-unit apartment building, apartment
complex, residential real estate development, or other multi-
family residential area (other than a municipality, township, or
other local government jurisdiction); or(iii) patrons of a hotel or other public accommodations facility;
or
(C) operated by the Federal Government (or by a concessionaire onbehalf of the Federal Government) for the benefit of members of the
Armed Forces and their dependents or employees of any department
or agency and their dependents.53
WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 39-46 (1986). Membership in fuzzy categoriesis "graded, rather than all or none." Teresa M. Alexander & James T. Enns, Age Changes in
the Boundaries of Fuzzy Categories, 59 CHILD DEv. 1372, 1372 (1988). In talking about word
meaning, Michael Green notes: "it may be impossible to come up with a set of conditions,
each member of which is necessary and the totality of which is sufficient, for a thing falling
under a term. Instead, meanings may consist of clusters of conditions, not all of which are
necessary and no specific set of which is sufficient. The applicability of the word may simplybe the result of the satisfaction of a sufficiently large number of conditions within the cluster."Michael Steven Green, Dworkin 's Fallacy, or What the Philosophy of Language Can't Teach
Us About the Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1897, 1901 (2003).
12 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 4701, 5102, 5520a (West 2012).
" 15 U.S.C.A. § 8003 (West 2012).
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If a particular swimming pool fails to meet one of the three conditions for being
public, it simply is not a public pool, at least as defined by the U.S. Code.
Another section of the U.S. Code prescribes the meaning of "appliance lamp."
54
If the lamp has a voltage higher than the maximum specified in the definition, if the
lamp is sold in other than retail settings, or if the designations on the lamp packaging
do not meet the conditions set forth in the statutory definition, the lamp fails to
qualify for, and become subject to or benefit from, whatever statutory provisions
apply to appliance lamps.
Prescriptive definitions may be connotative or intensional. They may assign
meaning to a term by designating a broader class and then establishing features that
distinguish members of the defined term. So, a statutorily defined "qualified joint
venture" is one whose only members are a husband and wife who both "materially
participate" in the business of the joint venture and who elect to be governed by a
particular statute.55 The universal or essential characteristic of all qualified joint
ventures is that their only members are spouses who actively engage in the business.
Descriptive and prescriptive definitions are distinguished by their approach to
word meaning. The descriptive definition recognizes uncertainty, incompleteness
and the impossibility of fashioning a precise definition that will cover all-even
unforeseen-instances. The prescriptive definition assumes that: (i) meaning can be
assigned, (ii) meaning can be precise; (iii) there are essential characteristics of the
instances that fall within the meaning of any term; and (iv) meaning can be
articulated by a statement of required conditions or attributes. The prescriptive
definition precludes doubt; any instance that lacks an element required by a
prescriptive definition is excluded.
B. Correlation Between Types of Terms Defined and Definitional Techniques
In trying to predict what techniques of definition might be best suited for
different types of terms defined, we might expect that words and phrases in our first
category (terms with many meanings) would be defined descriptively, and that
words and phrases falling within our second category (terms with no stand-alone
meaning) would be defined prescriptively. In the first instance, ordinary terms that
have many distinct meanings, the definition must limit meaning by indicating which
of the several senses of the term applies in the statutory context. So, for many
ambiguous terms, we see statutory definitions that focus meaning, not so much by
enumerating essential characteristics, but by either indicating the intended usage of
the term or by listing typical referents of the term.
For example, a word like "security" has multiple meanings. When used in the
sense of an instrument that documents ownership or a right to payment, the word is
usually defined in statutes by reference to a list of qualifying objects. In a
54 Per its definition in 42 U.S.C.A. § 6291(29)(T) (West 2012):
"appliance lamp" means any lamp that-
(i) is specifically designed to operate in a household appliance, has a maximum
wattage of 40 watts, and is sold at retail, including an oven lamp, refrigerator lamp,
and vacuum cleaner lamp; and
(ii) is designated and marketed for the intended application, with-
(I) the designation on the lamp packaging; and
(II) Marketing materials that identify the lamp as being for appliance use.
5 26 U.S.C.A. § 761 (West 2012).
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bankruptcy context, the term "security" "includes" notes, stocks, treasury stocks,
bonds, debentures, collateral trust certificates, and transferable shares, as well as any
"other claim or interest commonly known as 'security,"' but emphatically does notinclude "currency, check, draft, bill of exchange, or bank letter of credit," or several
other enumerated "non-securities."56 The list of referents is not exhaustive, yet it
conveys a sense of what is and is not included within the term's scope. In a very
different context, Indian tribes' "powers of self-government" include, in Title 25 of
the U.S. Code, "all governmental powers" possessed by the tribe and its constituent
authorities and agencies; that definition goes on to make it clear that Indian tribes
possess the "inherent power... hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminaljurisdiction over all Indians."" That definition describes what is included within the
term, and, in so doing, acknowledges and confirms a substantive right that is
associated with the term.
In each of the foregoing examples, the descriptive definition does what it ought
to; it clarifies what sense of the term is intended without contradicting ordinary
understanding.
But sometimes the statutory definition of a commonly used and understood word
is a prescriptive one. When this happens, a condition is imposed on meaning that
may disconnect the common understanding of the term from its defined meaning.
The definition of "small business debtor" in the Bankruptcy Code is long and
involved, but any debtor included within the term's coverage must have no more
than $2,343,300 in debt.58 There is something that is absolutely essential to being a
small business debtor, at least as that term is defined in the Bankruptcy Code (and
that essential attribute is probably not a characteristic that comports with our
everyday usage or ordinary understanding of the term-in fact, the definition may in
some ways contradict an ordinary understanding of the term). And, although a
"foreign proceeding," as defined in that same section of the Bankruptcy Code,
"means a collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign county,
including an interim proceeding," that process must be undertaken "under a law
relating to insolvency or adjustment of debt in which proceeding the assets and
affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the
purpose of reorganization or liquidation."59 In resolving the ambiguity inherent in
the phrase, the statutory definition imposes a requirement-absent from the term's
ordinary meaning-to which all instances of the term must adhere.
Just as words and phrases having many meanings sometimes beg for definition in
a statutory context, so do terms that have no meaning. Since there is no actual usage
of these terms, the legislature must stipulate meaning. We would expect prescriptive
definitions to be the norm in these cases.
The term "near elderly person" is defined on two occasions in the U.S. Code. In
one case, persons at least fifty-five years old but less than sixty-two qualify, and aredeemed to be "near elderly;" some titles later, the near elderly have gotten
younger-anyone at least fifty years of age, but not yet sixty-two, is a near elderly
56 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012).
25 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (West 2012).
25 U.S.C.A. § 101(51d) (West 2012).
'9 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(23) (West 2012).
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person.6" Membership in the near elderly category can, in both instances, be
objectively determined without any reference to what it means to be elderly in a
substantive sense.
Prescriptive, denotative definitions should be appropriate for phrases that are
composed of modifiers attached to familiar and meaningful words. Phrases like
excessive amount, exclusive processor, covered permanent improvement, and
innocent purchaser distinguish a subset of a larger collection of instances by
focusing on particular attributes or characteristics. So, in order to qualify as a
"covered permanent improvement" under 25 U.S.C. § 2206, an addition must satisfy
two necessary and sufficient conditions: it must be both part of a decedent's estate
and attached to "a parcel of trust of restricted land that is also, in whole or in part,
included in the estate of a decedent."6 If either of those two conditions is not
present with respect to the improvement, its status as a "covered" permanent
improvement fails.
Other definitions of nonsensical terms do not convey the same sense of certainty;
they are descriptive and open to interpretation; accordingly, it is more difficult to
objectively determine what instances are included. There is no anchor of common
usage or shared understanding to tether the term to either the real world or familiar
concepts. So, "incidental property" includes property "commonly conveyed with...
a debtor's principal residence .... "62 And, for purposes of federal securities laws,
an "exclusive processor" is a type of securities information processor or self-
regulatory organization that undertakes a wide variety of activities "on an exclusive
basis."6" Without a foundation of ordinary meaning, a descriptive definition cannot
specify one sense among many or expand or contract ordinary meaning. In
assigning meaning to terms like "incidental property" and "exclusive processor,"
descriptive definitions relate fuzzy modifiers to equally fuzzy nouns."
For terms of many meanings, descriptive definitions can quickly and efficiently
indicate which sense of the word or phrase applies. And for terms with no meaning,
prescriptive definitions establish meaning. For commonly used terms with well-
accepted meanings, the utility of any definition is debatable. Looking at examples of
these definitions, we see that they sometimes expand or limit ordinary meaning in
unexpected ways.
Purportedly descriptive definitions of common, well-understood terms may
muddy the waters more than clarify them. What might first appear to be a perfectly
harmless descriptive definition, one that seemingly clarifies the meaning of a term by
indicating what is and is not included, may actually change meaning, either
incorporating instances that would not ordinarily fall within the term's scope, or
limiting the term to exclude items ordinarily covered. So, an "employee," as defined
60 Per 25 U.S.C.A. § 4103 (West 2012), "the term 'near-elderly person' means a person
who is at least 55 years of age and less than 62 years of age." On the other hand, according to
42 U.S.C.A. § 1437 (West 2012), "[t]he term 'near-elderly person' means a person who is at
least 50 years of age but below the age of 62."
61 25 U.S.C.A. § 2206 (West 2012).
62 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012).
63 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c (West 2012).
64 MANUEL ATIENZA & JUAN MANERO, A THEORY OF LEGAL SENTENCES 64 (1998):
definitions do nothing more than "relate words to [other] words."
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in 2 U.S.C. § 1602, "means any individual who is an officer, employee, partner,
director, or proprietor;" the definition goes on to explicitly exclude from its scope
independent contractors and volunteers. 5 Although the definition seems, at first
glance, reasonable enough, we might wonder whether owners and directors would
normally be thought of as being employees of a business. In fact, the wording of the
definition itself implicitly acknowledges that officers, directors, partners, and
proprietors are usually not "employees." Another definition of "employee" in the
U.S. Code expands its meaning to include applicants for employment and former
employees,66 bringing within the term's compass individuals who, in most cases, are
very clearly not "employed."
If some definitions in the U.S. Code vest meaning in "employee" in a way that
expands its coverage outside of ordinary meaning, other definitions limit the word's
scope. The definition of "employee" in section 4301 of Title 5 is one that, first,
describes the term by including all individuals "employed in or under an agency"
within its coverage, and, then, goes on to exclude eight classes of people who would
otherwise fall within the definition.67 The definition is descriptive initially, but then
it becomes somehow the opposite, listing types of referents explicitly removed from
the initial description of the term's meaning. The result is a sort of hybrid definition
that assigns meaning by creating a collection of objects and then specifically
excluding particular members of that collection.
"Food" is defined repeatedly in the U.S. Code.68 Nearly all of those definitions
somehow expand or contract the common understanding of the term. Consider
"food" as a cluster of instances, some of which are closer to prototypical instances of
food (e.g., a hamburger or an apple) than others. Most of the U.S. Code definitions
of food explicitly either include or exclude outlying instances of food from the scope
of the defined term. So, on one occasion within Title 15 of the U.S. Code, unusual
instances are encompassed in the ambit of "food": "[t]he term 'food' means (1)
articles used for food and drink for man or other animals, (2) chewing gum, and (3)
articles used for components of any such article."69 If asked whether chewing gum
or something like MSG qualified as "food," most of us would not have an immediate
reaction one way or the other; we would have to think about it. But neither of those
items would come to mind when someone mentions food.
Another definition of "food" within the U.S. Code, this time in Title 7, explicitly
excludes from the definition's scope hot foods "ready for immediate consumption."7
While that definition takes away with one hand, removing from its coverage items
that we would routinely and without hesitation identify as food and that probably lie
close to the prototypical instance of "food," the definition adds with the other hand,
65 2 U.S.C.A. § 1602 (West 2012).
66 3 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West 2012): "The term 'employee' includes an applicant for
employment and a former employee."
67 5 U.S.C.A. § 4301 (West 2012).
68 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C.A. § 2012 (West 2012), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 55, 2052 (West 2012), and 21
U.S.C.A. § 321 (West 2012).
69 15 U.S.C.A. § 55 (West 2012).
'o 7 U.S.C.A. § 2012 (k) (West 2012).
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including within its scope "seeds... for use in gardens to produce food for personal
consumption."71
Definitions of commonly used and understood terms, whether couched in
descriptive or prescriptive language, have a prescriptive effect. By including
instances that a common understanding of the term would not encompass, or by
removing instances that we would normally associate with a word or phrase,
definitions of well-understood words and phrases inevitably change meaning.
IV. PURPOSES OF DEFINITION
The statutory definition may-intentionally or not-narrow the lens of meaning
or expand it; the best definitions may simply and succinctly restate meaning in a way
that suggests to the reader a particular sense out of many possible ones. But
definition inevitably-sometimes subtly, sometimes radically-changes meaning
even as it tries to accurately reflect it. If a single word "invites" meaning, rather than
fixes it,72 then more words may either bewitch a reader, offering too rich a
combination of implications, or starve him, taking away the staples of meaning on
which he normally depends. The more we talk about meaning, the more we change
it. So, why define? What legislative ends are achieved by the statutory definition?
And, are those ends firthered by particular types or techniques of definition?
A. Creating a Model
If law structures and orders a community,73 an arrangement of legislation like the
U.S. Code might represent a model for the organization and operation of the
community that it governs. In imposing order on a diverse, complicated, and messy
reality and, at the same time, anticipating how things will change, statutes are often
framed in what Judge Posner has called "a highly specific language."74 That highly
specialized language establishes standards to which the governed are expected to
conform. To textually establish a structure for governance, Manuel Atienza, Ruiz
Manero, and others have suggested that two vehicles are required: "norms of conduct
and definitions or conceptual rules.""5  Definitions, "allow the identification of
71 id.
72 Michael Johnson, Language and Cognition in Products Liability, in LANGUAGE IN THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (Judith N. Levi & Anne Graffam Walker, eds., 1990). In discussing how
individual words trigger individual comprehension, Johnson notes that "words do not have
meanings, they invite them."
73 DEBORAH CAO, TRANSLATING LAW 13 (2007). "Law exists as a set of prescriptions
having the form of imperatives, defining and enforcing the arrangements, relationships,
procedures, and patterns of behavior that are to be followed in a society." Id.
74 See KLINCK, supra note 24, at 90 (quoting Richard Posner, Law and Literature: A
Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REv. 1351, 1365 (1986)). Posner was actually referring to the
language of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
75 See ATIENZA & MANERO, supra note 64, at 63: "[Carlos] Alchourron and [Eugenio]
Bulygin hold that a legal order can be constructed satisfactorily with only two categories of
sentences, namely, norms of conduct and definitions or conceptual rules." Id. Atienza and
Manero note that Alchourron and Bulygin "characterize power-conferring rules as
definitions." Id.
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norms by elucidating the sense in which expressions are used."76 Falling within a
statutory definition results in becoming subject to normative rules.
The interpretation of text is in many ways private; but legislation can be
successful and legitimate only to the extent that meaning is public and shared.77
Legislation assumes that the governed can both understand the import of statutory
text" and appropriately conform its behavior to that text. If the "use of language
assumes a competence in the audience that the utterance does not convey,"79 we can
appreciate why definitions have come to be the rule, rather than the exception, in
legislation. In a perfect world, definitions could establish that competence among
the audience and fill the gap between the specialized language used by those who
govern and the ordinary language employed by the governed.
Technical language employs specialized vocabularies; unfamiliar terms are used
and familiar words are used in unusual ways. ° In the absence of definition,
legislators either assume that meaning is shared among readers or are intentionally
ambiguous or vague, preferring to leave to courts and other interpreters the hard
work of determining the precise application of a statutory term.8
76 Id. at 62, again referring to the work of Alchourron and Bulygin: "they characterize
definitions as sentences that do not express norms (although they may have normative
consequences), but rather allow us to identify norms by elucidating the sense in which certain
expressions are used."
77 See DIcKERSON, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 4, at 25. In characterizing legal
instruments (including statutes, ordinances, regulations, and wills) as communication vehicles,
Dickerson notes: "To be effective ... such an instrument must carry the same meaning to
those who execute it as the draftsman." Vlad Perju cites Habermas in echoing the notion that
meaning must be somehow shared among the drafter of laws and those who are governed by
those laws: "the only legitimate laws are those whose addressees can see themselves as the
laws' rational authors." Vlad Perju, A Comment on "Legisprudence," 89 B. U. L. REv. 427
(2009).
78 MATTILA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL LINGUISTICS, supra note 8, at 34: "the correct
understanding of a message often presupposes that the recipient has sufficient prior
knowledge of the matter in question."
79 See White, supra note 29, at 1973 ("Any use of language assumes a competence in the
audience that the utterance itself does not confer.").
80 See Mary Jane Morrison, Excursions Into the Nature of Legal Language, 37 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 271, 314 (1989), who suggests that there are:
three types of technical terms: (1) terms that never have had ordinary uses because
they are not from ordinary language at all and instead are from theories (physics'
"quark"); (2) terms that were once connected to ordinary words at least marginally by
using one among many of the meanings of the ordinary word but today function in
theories that undergird the other uses . . . ; and (3) terms that have uses in the
discipline that are fixed to one among the many uses of the ordinary word, i.e., that are
fixed on one out of the many meanings of the ordinary language word ....
81 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLum. L. REV. 527,
528 (1947) ("Statutes as well as constitutional provisions at times embody purposeful
ambiguity or are expressed with a generality for future unfolding.").
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By assigning a name to an object or abstraction, the legislature instructs its
audience that the defined term-functioning almost as a sign82 -stands for what the
definition either describes or dictates. The legitimacy of the definition, or the degree
to which the audience accepts what the legislature says, may have something to do
with both the type of term defined and the techniques used to define it.
By defining terms, statutes create categories into which behaviors, entities,
individuals, and actions-both present and future-are somehow made to fit.
8 3
Rules enumerated in legislation apply only to the extent that the associated
definitions are somehow satisfied. With respect to prescriptive definitions, the
conditions set forth in the definition must be met and, with respect to descriptive
ones, the instance to which the normative provisions apply must somehow
sufficiently resemble the prototypical category member. If the entirety of the U.S.
Code is in some sense a model of the real world, then definitions serve as building
blocks in constructing that model.
B. Controlling the Future
When it defines, the legislature requires that words used in the statute be
understood in particular ways. When terms are defined prescriptively, the power of
the reader to interpret the word or phrase is even more severely restricted. To define
is to limit,"4 and by setting forth the meaning of a term, legislative drafters may set
limits beyond which interpreters cannot venture.
Legislation enacted in 2010 established a complex regulatory structure designed
to administer health care benefits and insurance. Venturing into uncharted waters,
Congress incorporated more than four-hundred definitions into the text of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act." Among those definitions is one for "qualified
health plan," which sets forth terms and conditions that any health plan wishing to be
treated as such is required to meet.86 The definition is prescriptive; if any one of its
82 See Monroe Beardsley, Categories, 8 REV. METAPHYSICS. 3, 23 (1954) ("To interpret a
sign is not to respond to it or to describe actual or probably responses: it is to say that a certain
response would be good, in terms of a specific standard, if the sign occurred.").
83 Id. at 3 ("A category is at least a way of dividing up the world ... [i]t is always ... an
anticipation of experience as well, since it provides a pair of pigeonholes that future
experience is to be put into.").
84 David Melinkoff notes that the language of lawyers is often and expectedly imprecise:
"Many of the words that lawyers traditionally use never have had any definite meaning."
DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 301 (1963). Once defined, the term cannot
be interpreted to mean something that lies outside the scope of the definition: "by precisely
establishing the meaning of the terms used in legislative language, definitions fulfill the
function of reducing the 'semantic power' of judges and legal doctrine." ATIENZA & MANERO,
supra note 64, at 73.
85 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
86 42 U.S.C.A. § 18021 (West 2012):
The term "qualified health plan" means a health plan that-
(A) has in effect a certification (which may include a seal or other indication of
approval) that such plan meets the criteria for certification described in section
18031 (c) of this title issued or recognized by each Exchange through which such plan
is offered;
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conditions is not satisfied, the health plan is not entitled to whatever benefits are
available to qualified health plans. When the legislation was drafted, Congress was
less than omniscient with respect to the future landscape of federally mandated
health insurance.87 But, by establishing that only those health plans in compliance
with specific and detailed conditions would qualify for certain treatment, Congress
sought to ensure that at least certain aspects of the health care regime comported
with legislative expectations. Interpreters would theoretically be powerless to
designate other instances of health plans falling outside statutory parameters as
"qualified health plans."
Even definitions with descriptive features allow legislatures to exercise some
control over readers, and to erect boundaries outside of which interpretation ought
not to stray. So, "motor vehicles," defined in sections 30B and 30D of the Internal
Revenue Code, are vehicles that are "manufactured primarily for use on public
streets, roads, and highways (not including a vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or
rails) and which [have] at least 4 wheels."88 At least for purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code, a motorcycle can never be classified as a motor vehicle. Other
descriptive definitions explicitly exclude instances from the definition's scope. An
"existing major fuel-burning installation" is, according to the statutory definition,
one that is (unsurprisingly) not a new major fuel-burning installation; the definition
goes on to exclude from the definition of "existing major fuel-burning installation"
two categories of installations that would otherwise qualify.89 Again, under no
(B) provides the essential health benefits package described in section 18022(a) of this
title; and
(C) is offered by a health insurance issuer that-
(i) is licensed and in good standing to offer health insurance coverage
in each State in which such issuer offers health insurance coverage
under this chapter;
(ii) agrees to offer at least one qualified health plan in the silver level
and at least one plan in the gold level in each such Exchange;
(iii) agrees to charge the same premium rate for each qualified health
plan of the issuer without regard to whether the plan is offered
through an Exchange or whether the plan is offered directly from the
issuer or through an agent; and
(iv) complies with the developed by the Secretary under section
18031(d) of this title and such other requirements as an applicable
Exchange may establish.
87 Congress, in fact, had to predict-and order-the future. See CAO, supra note 73, at
122: "legislative language must anticipate a world that does not exist at the time of expression
and must be prepared for an infinity of possibilities."
8' 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 30B, 30D (West 2012).
89 42 U.S.C.A. § 8302(12) (West 2012):
(A) The term... "existing major fuel-burning installation" means any installation
which is not a new major fuel-burning installation.
(B) Such term does not include a major fuel-burning installation for the extraction of
mineral resources located-
(i) on or above the Continental Shelf of the United States, or
(ii) on wetlands areas adjacent to the Continental Shelf of the United
States, where coal storage is not practicable or would produce adverse
effects on environmental quality.
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(foreseeable) circumstances could interpretation of the statute confer "major fuel-
burning installation" status on those two types of facilities.9"
Like any category into which some events and objects must fall and others be
excluded, a definition ranks and relates the experiences and events to which it may
apply in comparison to each other. As items are either included or excluded from a
category, they are deemed either similar or distinct. Absent definition, categories
established by statutory text still exist, but their boundaries are more likely to expand
and contract in reaction to both developments in the area and unforeseen applications
of the statutory text. Definitions impede-if not completely forestall-normal
evolutions in word meaning, at least in a statutory context. If, in ordinary discourse
and usage, the meaning of a word is always a work in progress, 9 then the role of the
definition is to finish the job. From the perspective of a legislative drafter who
wishes to ensure a particular understanding of statutory text-a and limit the
alternatives available to interpreters--"the deader the better,"92 at least with respect
to word meaning. The choice of definitional techniques-whether descriptive or
prescriptive, connotative or denotative-may signal the extent to which drafters-
intentionally or not-have effectively either closed the meaning of the term,
admitting no unexpected interlopers, or left meaning open, acknowledging the
impossibility of anticipating all circumstances.
90 Frederick Schauer, in a 1988 article, looks at formalism, and, as he characterizes it,
defends it:
Formalism is the way in which rules achieve their "ruleness" precisely by doing what
is supposed to be the failing of formalism: screening off from a decisionmaker factors
that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise take into account. Moreover, it
appears that this screening off takes place largely through the force of the language in
which the rules are written. Thus the tasks performed by rules are tasks for which the
primary tool is the specific linguistic formulation of a rule.
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509, 510 (1988). In that article, Schauer frames
formalism in the context of a denial of choice. See generally id. Definitions certainly do not
foreclose all judgments by the interpreter, but, whether they are performative or
communicative, they do direct the interpreter toward a particular reading of a term and, in
some cases, eliminate potential constructions of the word.
91 Ernest Von Glaserfeld, Cognition, Construction of Knowledge, and Teaching, 80
SYNTHESE 121, 134 (1989) ("To be considered proficient in a given language requires two
things among others: to have available a large enough vocabulary, and to have constructed and
sufficiently accommodated and adapted the meanings associated with the words of that
vocabulary so that no conceptual discrepancies become apparent in ordinary linguistic
interactions.").
92 Particular terms of art come to be relied on (maybe too frequently) by lawyers because
they believe those words' meaning to be well-settled. David Melinkoff suggests that it is fear
that causes lawyers to stick with particular expressions, a misplaced belief that certain phrases
and articulations are certain in their application and impact: "It is precise now. We are safe
with it now. Leave us alone. Don't change. Here we stay till death or disbarment."
MELLINKOFF, supra note 84, at 295. With respect to peculiar and archaic legal expressions,
lawyers may find (unjustified) comfort in their use, assuming that their meanings are well-
established. "The fact that [words] are archaic is a recommendation ... The deader the
better; that means they can't move around. 'Archaic' is taken as another way of saying that
these words haven't changed since Coke, and anything that old must be good. Not so. Many
words that old have simply been bad longer." Id. at 304.
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Definition may also allow drafters to close loopholes and prevent "willful
misinterpretation."93 By making clear that particular instances fall outside of the
statutory definition,94 drafters recognize that the text of the definition itself might
admit instances not intended to be included, and that interpreters might successfully
pervert statutory language to accomplish outcomes contrary to the legislative
purpose. By explicitly removing those instances from the definition's compass,
drafters try to ensure the intended interpretation.95
Schauer distinguishes between the "long-term mobility of language [and] its
short-term plasticity."96  The fact of definition addresses the mobility of word
meaning over time, while the choice of definitional techniques signals, at least to
some extent, the willingness or reluctance of the legislature to live with at least some
malleability in the definition's application.
C. Being Precise and Increasing Certainty
If definitions control future interpretations of the statute, they may also clarify
current application of the statute and promote predictability. To the extent that the
meaning of terms used in statutes is expressed precisely, those individuals governed
by a statute may be better able to comply with its dictates and conform behavior to
the standards enumerated. Precisely defining terms used in statutes might narrow the
margin of uncertainty in application, 97 and reduce the number of hard cases.98
93 In 1914, a report, prepared by a Special Committee of Congress and submitted to the
American Bar Association, considered the creation of an official legislative drafting service.
In proposing a manual for legislative drafters, the Committee noted that legislative language
"should not only be capable of being clearly understood, but should be incapable of willful
misinterpretation." SPECIAL COMM. ON LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 5 (1914) (presented at the meeting of the American
Bar Association, in Washington, D.C., on October 20-22, 1914)
94 See, for example, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15g (West 2012), which makes clear that neither
proprietorships nor partnerships are included within the definition of "natural person." The
definition of "dealer" in 26 U.S.C.A. § 5845 (West 2012) both excludes particular types of
businesses that might otherwise fall within the definition's scope, and brings outlying
instances into the definition: "The term 'dealer' means any person, not a manufacturer or
importer, engaged in the business of selling, renting, leasing, or loaning firearms and shall
include pawnbrokers who accept firearms as collateral for loans."
95 See ATIENZA & MANERO, supra note 64, at 73 ("[Dlefinitions fulfil [sic] the function of
reducing the 'semantic power' of judges and legal doctrine.").
96 See Schauer, supra note 90, at 524.
97 DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 40, 145. Dickerson notes that some terms have "wide
margins of uncertainty", and others relatively "narrow ones." He suggests that definitions can
"resolve uncertainties in the cloudy areas surrounding vague terms."
98 Scott Soames, Interpreting Legal Texts: What is and What is Not, Special About the
Law (2007) (paper presented at an International Conference on Law, Language, and
Interpretation at the University of Akureyri, Iceland, April 1-2, 2007), available at
http://www-bcf.usc.edu/-soames/selpub/InterpretingLegalTexts.pdf. Soames describes
"semantically hard cases" as those in which "the meanings of the relevant legal texts, plus all
nonlegal and nonmoral facts, fail to determine [the] (legally correct) outcome." Definitions
that serve primarily communicative functions, in focusing the interpreter's attention on a
particular meaning, might cause some cases to become at least less semantically difficult. Id.
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Sometimes, precisely establishing the limits of a term's scope makes perfect
sense. The word "child" is defined repeatedly in the U.S. Code.
99 Depending on the
context in which it appears, "child" may or may not include individuals who are
more than eighteen years of age, who can support themselves, who are married, who
are not related by blood to a parent, who are not yet born, or who have died.
00 Each
particular statutory definition of the word narrows the lens of meaning in the context
of what it is about a child that is important in the statutory context.
But for every precisely worded definition that clarifies a term's application,
another equally precisely defined term complicates an understanding of what
instances are covered by the term's reach. The definition of "food" in 7 U.S.C. §
2012 is a long and complicated one; it excludes all "hot foods" except those that fall
within any of six clauses. The structure of the definition is such that it, first,
incorporates an ordinary understanding of "food," and then, (i) excludes certain
categories of what we would think of as food (i.e., hot food); (ii) enumerates
exceptions to those excluded categories (thereby bringing more instances of "food"
into the fold); and, finally, (iii) adds new categories of normally non-food items (like
equipment used to procure food) to the definition's scope."0 ' In a definition that is
more than six hundred words long, clarity and comprehension may have been
sacrificed in an effort to be precise.
"Consumer product" is defined in Title 42 of the U.S. Code in the context of
energy conservation programs.' 2 In section 6291, "consumer product" is associated
with a definition that, first, excludes an item that we would ordinarily think of as a
consumer product (automobile); second, limits the term's compass to objects that
consume energy or, in a small number of cases, water (thereby eliminating large
classes of objects that we ordinarily understand to be consumer products); and, third,
eliminates the requirement that the particular object is actually used by a consumer.
In the case of "food" and "consumer product," it is hard to see how precision in
definition increases clarity. The definitions may, indeed, serve certainty, but at
significant cost in terms of understandability.
If the intent behind definition is to reduce, if not eliminate, indeterminacy and
vagueness, it is an effort whose success is undermined by everyday language use.
The more precise the definition of a common or ordinary term, the more baggage
accompanies it throughout its statutory life. But that baggage--cumbersome and
unwieldy-is very different from the cloud of meaning that customarily surrounds a
word or phrase used in ordinary discourse.
99 In Title 5 alone, "child" is defined seven times. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 8101, 8341, 8345, 8424,
8441, 8467 (West 2012).
100 See, for example, 5 U.S.C.A §§ 8341 and 8441 (West 2012) ("child" includes
unmarried dependent children between eighteen and twenty-two years of age who are
students); 5 U.S.C.A. § 8101 (West 2012) ("child" includes stepchildren and posthumous
children and children over the age of eighteen who are incapable of self-support but does not
include married children); and 5 U.S.C.A. § 8342 (West 2012) ("'child' includes a natural and
adopted child, but does not include a stepchild.").
1o' See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2012 (West 2012). This may be one of those definitions that "strips
language of its sociological and normative complexity, . . . " and substitutes something
equally, if not more, complicated, but far less rich. CHRISTOPHER HUTTON, LANGUAGE,
MEANING AND THE LAW 101 (2009).
102 42 U.S.C.A. § 6291 (West 2012).
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D. Promoting Readability and Efficiency in Drafting
Most legislative drafting manuals justify the use of definitions by suggesting that
including definitions in the text of a statute results in an economy of expression and
improvements in readability. The rationale is that by assigning a name to a complex
set of conditions or attributes, drafters are able to state statutory provisions more
succinctly and clearly.1 3 And, as a result, the statutory message is more easily
received and understood. Moreover, use of the definition ensures - at least in theory
- that terms are used consistently throughout what may be a lengthy text.
If legislation is expressed in a technical language,"° its vocabulary is likely to
consist of terms of art that either have no meaning in ordinary English or have
several different meanings. Those terms of art are often shorthand expressions of
complicated concepts whose application is confined to a particular discipline; "one
of the primary utility features of a technical language is that it enables those of us
who speak it to say more in a more comprehensible, thorough and exact way, using
less time and fewer words than ... ordinary English."'0 5 The logic of defined terms
is evident in some of the especially convoluted and apparently meaningless terms
defined in the U.S. Code. Phrases like 'Rita GO Zone," "Wilma GO Zone," "Price-
Anderson Incident," and "means-tested Federal benefit program" stand in the place
of textual descriptions of what those terms represent. 106 Assigning a name to all of
the instances or phenomena subsumed in the definition allows the statute's
normative provisions to be more efficiently articulated and ensures that there are no
discrepancies or contradictions among the statute's possibly many references to the
phenomenon or group of objects.
While the legislature may very well intend that those otherwise meaningless
terms be understood consistently across a statute, it is more of a stretch to suggest
that legislators who define common terms intend a similarly consistent
interpretation. A reader wonders if legislators remember the definitions of common
terms set forth in one part of a statute as they draft other sections that occur much
later in the text.
Literature suggests that "lexical chunks"-content rich phrases or groupings of
words-are more easily learned and better incorporated into a cognitive model, at
least by children, than individual words.0 7 Perhaps frequently repeated terms that
refer back to a statutory definition will trigger responses that are appropriate, as
gauged by the normative provisions of statutory text.
103 "[D]efinitions can reduce complexity by allowing the bill's key operating provisions to
be stated simply, even when the concepts they involve are extremely complicated."
LAWRENCE E. FILSON & SANDRA L. STROKOFF, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER'S DESK REFERENCE 129
(2008).
104 CAO, supra note 73, at 54.
105 Morrison, supra note 80, at 306.
106 "Rita GO Zone" and "Wilma GO Zone" are defined in 26 U.S.C.A. § 1400M (West2012). "WMD" is defined in 50 U.S.C.A. § 2902 (West 2012). "Price-Anderson incident" isdefined in 42 U.S.C.A. § 17373 (West 2012). A "means-tested Federal benefit program" is
defined in 20 U.S.C.A. § 1059e (West 2012).
107 See Ben Zimmer, Chunking, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 16, 2010, at MM30,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2O10/09/19/magazine/19FOB-OnLanguage-Zimmer.
html.
1024 [Vol. 60:999
WAGGING, NOT BARKING
E. Leveling the Playing Field
Some definitions succinctly, and without elaboration, clarify the ways in which
words or phrases are used in statutes. These statements, far from assigning a
definitive meaning to a particular word or phrase, instead, put drafters and readers
alike on notice, and create a context in which the statute can be situated. They are
almost not definitions in a classic sense, yet they are designated as such by statute.
So, in the context of Head Start programs, "health" is defined as follows:
the term "health," when used to refer to services or care provided to
enrolled children, their parents, or their siblings, shall be interpreted to
refer to both physical and mental health ."
The definition evidences the intent of the legislation that-at least with respect to
either mental or physical health-there should be no question about the scope of the
term as used in the statute. Similarly, the definitions section of the Copyright Act
includes this short definition (if we can call it that) of "device, machine or process:"
"A 'device', 'machine', or 'process' is one now known or later developed."
' '
To the extent that the sense of a term is quickly and simply clarified, we expect
readers to share at least some of the same responses to the word or phrase. With
compatible, albeit inexact, understandings of meaning created by quasi-definition,
there is at least a context established so that individual comprehension can take place
on the same plane." ° The definition sets forth ground rules-easy to remember and
articulate-that apply throughout a reading of the statute. The definition establishes
a shared cognitive space that ensures that drafters and readers share some
assumptions and understandings, inexact though they may be."'
If definitions sometimes efficiently clarify by inclusion, they may equally well
exclude certain possible interpretations. The definition of "database" in the Federal
Agency Data Mining Reporting Act does not tell us what it necessarily is; the
definition only informs us as to what it is not: "[t]he term 'database' does not
include telephone directories, news reporting, information publicly available to any
member of the public without payment of a fee, or databases of judicial and
administrative opinions or other legal research sources.", 2  In 5 U.S.C. § 8342,
"child" is deemed to include natural or adopted children, but not stepchildren. And,
in 5 U.S.C. § 8421, the only defmition of "service" is a statement to the effect that
"the term 'service' does not include military service." If a term is capable of
108 42 U.S.C.A. § 9852c (West 2012).
... 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012).
110 "[T]o understand what someone has said or written means no less but also no more than
to have built up a conceptual structure that, in the given context, appears to be compatible
with the structure the speaker had in mind .... " See Von Glaserfeld, supra note 91, at 134.
11 Communication is successful when the parties understand each other in a way that
meets each of their expectations. And whether that happens depends upon the extent to which
each participant's interpretation of the words used in the text matches the other's. "Each of us
is a circle of experiences and meaning that occasionally, through language, meet or overlap
with others, at least at the edges." White, supra note 29, at 1974. If definitions can ensure
that the individual understandings overlap, at least with respect to the intended meaning of a
particular term, then they will have served their purpose.
112 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ee-3 (West 2012).
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attracting different meanings, one purpose of definition is to ensure that the
appropriate sense is the one attached to the word in the statute.
V. FUNCTIONS AND EFFECTS OF DEFINITION
The inclusion of so many definitions is one of many ways in which legislative
texts differ from ordinary ones. Legislative vocabulary, grammar, and syntax are all
unusual, at least when compared to texts and communication that most of us
encounter in our non-law lives." 3 Whether the nature of law requires such a
distinctive (and convoluted) style is a familiar debate.' But if there are reasons for
legislative speech to differ from ordinary language, those reasons likely have
something to do with the role that law-and, by implication, legislation-plays in
our lives.
A. Talking and Doing-Acts of Language and Law
Characterizing law, as others have done, as a "normative discourse""' highlights
what it is about law-and the language in which it is expressed-that makes it
different from other texts and other language. Law is normative-it has effects. Law
invests individuals with rights and obligations that they would not otherwise have; it
prescribes behaviors and it dictates how particular states of affairs are to be treated
by a community. But law is also a discourse, almost a conversation (albeit largely a
one-sided one)-it is a communication that describes how a community operates and
what it values; its import changes as its audience interacts with it and applies it.
If law-writ large-is a normative discourse, then so is legislation. It is an agent
that both informs a community and effects norms." 6 Legislation communicates, and,
as it does so, it changes the status, privileges, rights, and obligations of those to
whom it is addressed.
Statutory definitions even more emphatically illustrate the two levels on which
legal language operates. On the one hand, statutory definitions tell us what terms
mean in particular contexts; they are meant to clarify the message conveyed by the
legislature in the statute's normative clauses. The legislative speaker intends to
deliver information that will be recognized, understood, and appropriately acted
113 The unnecessary complexity of legislative language is not a new phenomenon. David
Mellinkoff notes that Thomas Jefferson recognized the problem and was determined not to
perpetuate it. "With his draft of a bill on criminal law, Jefferson wrote.... : 'In it's style Ihave aimed at accuracy, brevity and simplicity .... The same matter if couched in the
modem statutory language, with all it's tautologies, redundancies and circumlocutions wouldhave spread itself over many pages, and been unintelligible to those whom it most concerns."'
MELLINKOFF, supra note 84, at 252-253; see also Maley, supra note 12, at 25 ("[Legislation]
is commonly agreed to be a complex, intricate, even bizarre style of language.").
114 See ALFRED PHILLIPS, LAWYERS' LANGUAGE: How AND WHY LEGAL LANGUAGE ISDIFFERENT 30 (2003), where he describes the language of lawyers as "not only alien but also
alienating"; see also MELLINKOFF, supra note 84; and Peter Tiersma, Some Myths About Legal
Language, 2 L., CULTURE & HUMAN. 29 (2006).
115 See Francis Jay Mootz, III, Interpretation, in LAW AND THE HUMANITIES: ANINTRODUCTION 347 (Austin Sarat, Matt Anderson & Catherine 0. Frank eds., 2010) (citing
BRIAN BIx, LAW, LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 181 (1993)).
116 DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 25 (" [A] legal instrument is both (1) a crystallization and
declaration of rights, privileges, duties, and legal relationships and (2) a communication.").
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upon by the legislative audience;" 7 the definition is included so that the meaning of
the normative text is better understood.
Section 254b of Title 42 of the U.S. Code deals with health centers eligible to
receive federal aid. Among the grants that may be awarded pursuant to that section
are those to centers that provide services to certain agricultural workers. Section
254b includes the following definition of agriculture:
The term "agriculture" means farming in all its branches, including-
(i) cultivation and tillage of the soil
(ii) the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting of any
commodity grown on, in, or as an adjunct to or part of a commodity
grown in or on the land; and
(iii) any practice (including preparation and processing for market and
delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation to
market) performed by a farmer or on a farm incident to or in
conjunction with an activity described in clause (ii).'18
Apart from the paragraph in which it is defined, the word "agriculture" appears
but twice in section 254b (a section that is quite lengthy-more than 8500 words in
all). It appears once as part of the definition of "migratory agricultural worker" and
again within the definition of "seasonal agricultural worker.""
9 The word
"agricultural," however, occurs repeatedly in section 254b as it modifies both
worker(s) and chemicals on a number of occasions. The statutory definition of
agriculture is broad and inclusive; it makes clear that many activities related to
transportation of farming products are included within its scope. The definitions of
migratory and seasonal agricultural workers are similarly made a part of the statute,
not for the purpose of changing the status or rights of those individuals, but, instead,
in order to describe the type of health center eligible for federal funds. The
definition communicates what types of activities are intended to be included within
the statute's compass.
On the other hand, legislative definitions can also empower;"' they may confer a
particular status on individuals, entities, or situations, and invest those agents and
states of affairs with obligations, benefits, privileges, and rights. For example,
certain small and green energy producers, including "eligible solar, wind, waste or
geothermal facilities," are exempt, pursuant to section 824a-3 of Title 16, from some
117 Communication studies literature suggests that, in any cooperative communication, the
speaker must intend to convey information that is relevant in the context and the other party
must recognize that intention. See Prashant Parikh, Communication, Meaning, and
Interpretation, 23 LINGUISTICS & PILOSOPHY 185, 190 (2000).
8 42 U.S.C.A. § 254b (West 2012).
119 Per 42 U.S.C.A. § 254b (West 2012), "'migratory agricultural worker' means an
individual whose principal employment is in agriculture, who has been so employed within
the last 24 months, and who establishes for the purposes of such employment a temporary
abode." And, the term "'seasonal agricultural worker' means an individual whose principal
employment is in agriculture on a seasonal basis and who is not a migratory agricultural
worker."
120 Disagreeing with Alchourron's and Bulygin's characterization of definitions as "power-
conferring rules," Atienza and Manero suggest that the role they play is more ambiguous. See
ATIENZA & MANERO, supra note 64, at 62-63.
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federal energy regulations. An "eligible solar, wind, waste or geothermal facility" is
defined to mean-
a facility which produces electric energy solely by the use, as a primary
energy source, of solar energy, wind energy, waste resources or
geothermal resources; but only if-(i) either of the following is submitted to the Commission not later
than December 31, 1994:
(I) an application for certification of the facility as a qualifying
small power production facility; or
(II) notice that the facility meets the requirements for qualification;
and
(ii) construction of such facility commences not later than December
31, 1999, or, if not, reasonable diligence is exercised toward the
completion of such facility taking into account all factors relevant to
construction of the facility.12'
By falling--or purposefully moving-within the confines of the term's
definition, a facility gains regulatory freedoms unavailable to non-qualifying plants.
This definition does much more than communicate; it entitles certain facilities to
regulatory advantages set forth in the- statute's normative provisions. By being-or
becoming-the defined term, the facilities' entitlements and attributes are changed.
When definitions function in this way-when they create a status that brings with
it entitlements or sanctions-they serve a performative function; they are, in fact,
speech acts. 122 These definitions still communicate, but their performative function
is equally, if not more, important.
Distinguishing between what legal texts say and what they do'23 relates to a
broader discussion among linguists and philosophers that focuses on the difference
between "uttering words and what one does by uttering them.' ' 124 The idea that
certain types of speech or text have immediate and important effects is most
frequently associated with the work of J. L. Austin and John Searle.125
121 16 U.S.C.A. § 796(17)(E) (West 2012).
122 In fact, some have suggested that legislation is, in itself a speech act: "[w]hen the
legislature enacts a statute, it is performing speech acts in the classic, performative, Austinian
sense." Maley, supra note 12, at 27.
123 Sometimes, in a legal context, the distinction is between the meaning of the words used
in a law and the "content" of the law itself See Soames, supra note 98, at 12-15, where hediscusses Smith v. United States, a case involving the meaning of the phrase "a use of afirearm." See also KEPA KORTA & JOHN PERRY, How To SAY THINGS WITH WORDS; JOHN
SEARLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: FORCE, MEANING, AND THE MIND 169 (Savas L.
Tsohatzidis ed., 2007).
124 Cowart, supra note 13, at 496-97.
125 Searle's notion of speech acts is actually very broad. He claims that the study of speech
acts in language is in fact the study of the meaning of sentences. "Since every meaningful
sentence in virtue of its meaning can be used to perform a particular speech act... and since
every possible speech act can in principle be given an exact formulation in a sentence .... the
study of the meaning of sentences and the study of speech acts are not two independent
studies but one study from two different points of view." JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN
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Speech or text that in effect constitutes action obviously plays an important role
in law. While some writers suggest that all legislation effectively functions as a
speech act, with component parts individually serving performative functions as
well, "'26 my focus is necessarily on the statutory definition and its role in both the
communicative and performative behavior of legislation.
Legislation is both "an act of language and an act of law;"'' 21 it is a
communicative event and a performative act; it informs and it empowers.
2 8
Statutory definitions similarly serve these two functions; in few other contexts is
such a premium put on either the meaning of terms or the conditions to be satisfied
in order to fall within the scope of a term's import. While definitions may serve
both communicative and performative functions in legislative text, they do not do so
in equal measure. At times, the communicative purpose of the statutory definition
overwhelms any possible performative function, while, in other instances, the
performative function dominates.
By looking closely at the context in which statutory definitions appear and their
functions, we might learn to draft better definitions and we might more consistently,
or at least mindfully, interpret those definitions. Particular definitional techniques
may be more appropriate for either the communicative or performative function.
Moreover, particular definition techniques may actually work against
communication or empowerment, and, in turn, should be avoided in particular
contexts, depending on the role served by the definition. The effectiveness and
legitimacy of a definition may depend on both the purposes served-or sought to be
served-by the definition and its particular expression. To understand how
definitions might better serve these two distinct functions we ought to examine, on
the one hand, what it is that makes communication successful, and, on the other,
what it is about speech acts that make them work.
ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 18 (1969). The type of speech acts that this paper
emphasizes, however, are illocutionary acts:
[w]e thus detach the notions of referring and predicating from the notions of complete
speech acts as asserting, commanding, etc. . . . Austin baptized these complete
speech acts with the name "illocutionary acts"... [s]ome of the English verbs
denoting illocutionary acts are "state," "describe," "assert," "warn," "remark,"
:,comment.."command," "order,' "request," "criticize," "apologize," "censure,"
"approve," "welcome," "promise," object, "demand," and "argue."
Id. at23.
126 See Maley, supra note 12, at 27; see also CAO, supra note 73, at 21 ("A statute is a
master speech act with each provision constituting individual speech acts.").
127 Maley, supra note 12, at 27.
128 For characterizations of law as a communication, see DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 25
("That a legal instrument is a communication is seen most clearly in statutes, ordinances, and
regulations, and such dispositive instruments as wills."), and Mootz, supra note 115, at 349
("legal texts are communicative events"). By contrast, see ATIENZA & MANERO, supra note
64, at xii ("legal orders also contain other kinds of sentences-power-conferring rules-which
make it possible to introduce, modify, or derogate mandatory norms, and, in general, to bring
about normative change"), and Maley, supra note 12, at 29 ("the central role of legislation...
is... the creation by means of correctly enacted speech acts, of rights and duties.").
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B. Communicating Successfully
If we want to draft statutory definitions that successfully communicate, we ought
to think about what it is that makes any communication productive and what
conditions foster effective communication. Understanding the conditions necessary
for felicitous communication should help us determine, in the first place, whether
statutory definitions are as necessary as their current numbers in the United States
Code suggest, and, second, whether the methods we employ when we define termsin statutes support good communication. Moreover, if we explore the characteristics
of successful communication, we may find ways to assess the utility of those
statutory definitions that play a predominantly communicative role.
Ordinary communication doesn't require that the participants define their terms.
We assume, until we are proven wrong, that "what we intend to communicate is infact comprehended by the message recipient and that what we comprehend as the
recipient is in fact what the sender intended to communicate."' 9 We assume that the
sense of words used in a communication is shared--even if inexactly-between
speaker and audience.
In the case of words and phrases having many meanings, the context of ordinary
conversation or text is usually enough to allow disambiguation among multiple
meanings. Context enables the audience to select a meaning that makes sense given
the goals of the discourse. 3 ' Similarly, for words and phrases of well-established
meaning, successful communication does not require that we specify the boundaries
of meaning or that we flesh out all of the contours of a term's sense.' 3' Close enoughis good enough. In most discourse, it makes little difference if the participants share
an exactly identical understanding of a term's meaning: 'understanding' is a matter
of fit, rather than match."' 132
Words whose meanings are vague or ill-defined are often used in conversation or
text. 133 As a term is used, its meaning-at least in that context-is clarified. From
time to time, completely new words and phrases enter our vocabulary. Those terms
may acquire meaning by context or by description. Most commonly, though, words
acquire meaning by use. If invented terms strike a chord within a community and
come to be frequently used by speakers, they may become part of everyday speech;
their signification no longer requires any explanation.
129 Johnson, supra note 72, at 299.
130 Id. at 293 ("the meaning a language user attaches to a word or larger linguistic unit is in
significant part a function of the context in which it is embedded"); Von Glaserfeld, supra
note 91, at 131-32 ("The physical signals that travel from one communicator to another ... do
not actually carry or contain what we think of as 'meaning.' Instead, they should be
considered instructions to select particular meanings from a list... ").
'' Glanville L. Williams, Language and the Law-II, 61 THE L. QUARTERLY REV., 179,191 (1945), reprinted in LAW AND LANGUAGE 125 (Frederick Schauer ed., 1993) ("[T]he
words we use, though they have a central core of meaning that is relatively fixed, are ofdoubtful application to a considerable number of marginal cases.... the ordinary man is not
usually troubled with these perplexities.").
132 Von Glaserfeld, supra note 91, at 134.
133 See JOHN R. TAYLOR, LINGUISTIC CATEGORIZATION: PROTOTYPES IN LINGUISTIC THEORY56 (2d ed. 1995) (quoting R. W. Langacker, "no two speakers share precisely the same
linguistic system.").
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But what is it that so distinguishes legislation from ordinary discourse that we are
prone to define so many terms of all different types?
Underlying nearly all discussions of language and communication is the idea of
community. Our language is built by its speakers; 34 meanings of terms change over
time as communicants refine their use of particular terms to reflect changes in the
environment. James Boyd White suggests that a community is "defined by its
language"; those who successfully communicate constitute the community.
The community that engages in legislative discourse is not an easy one to
identify; there may, in fact, be several audiences who receive statutory
communications. Those audiences (judges, lawyers, regulators, the public) interpret
legislation for different purposes. Even within a group, members are far from
homogenous. Individuals from each audience interact differently with, and relate
differently to, legislative text. They bring to the text vastly different levels of
expertise.
Due process considerations certainly require that generally applicable statutes
should have a meaning that is clear "enough" to those to whom it applies.' When
the consequences of misunderstanding are great, it makes sense to provide at least
some clarification of what the legislative speaker intends when a particular term is
used. So, in prohibiting the making of animal crush videos, section 48 of Title 18 of
the U.S. Code defines an animal crush video.'37 That term may have acquired a
fairly well-understood sense among a specialized community of animal rights
activists and filmmakers, but to the larger community of individuals subject to
federal law, its implications are less than clear. Similarly, a phrase like "earned
income," used in the Internal Revenue Code,' is a descriptive one, but it is a term
that has a special meaning to tax practitioners and accountants. Definition of the
term both allows the general public to understand what the term means in a federal
tax context, and ensures that tax experts share a common frame of reference.
Context's role in clarifying meaning is obvious: context allows disambiguation;
it limits the referents of a term; and it enables participants in a communication to feel
confident that a sincere and felicitous exchange is taking place. The syntactic and
semantic environment in which a term occurs is but one aspect of context. The
shared knowledge and experience of speakers who use a term inform any exchange.
134 SOLAN, supra note 11, at 52, (quoting John Manning: "Even the strictest modern
textualists properly emphasize that language is a social construct."); White, supra note 29, at
1962 ("[L]anguage itself is socially constructed.").
135 White, supra note 29, at 1962.
136 MATILA, supra note 8, at 36: "[L]egal protection requires that texts intended in the first
place for use by lawyers should be easily understandable by every citizen."); Maley, supra
note 12, at 35 (quoting H. W. R. Wade) ("[I]t may be said that it is more important for a rule
of law to be certain that it is for it to be just.").
137 18 U.S.C.A. § 48 (West 2012) ("In this section the term 'animal crush video' means any
photograph, motion-picture film, video or digital recording, or electronic image that--(1)
depicts actual conduct in which 1 or more living non-human mammals, birds, reptiles, or
amphibians is intentionally crushed, burned, drowned, suffocated, impaled, or otherwise
subjected to serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 and including conduct that, if
committed against a person and in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, would violate section 2241 or 2242); and (2) is obscene.").
138 26 U.S.C.A. § 911(d)(2)(A) (West 2012).
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Marmor refers to a "rich contextual knowledge" that "gives meaning beyond
words,"'39 and Schauer suggests that "the members of a community possess shared
understandings that enable them to talk to all other members of the community."'' 40
In a legislative context, we share some understanding of the text, but probably far
less than a uniform one. Hart, who wrote at length on legal language, its meaning,
and effects, argued that all legal language must be read and interpreted in the context
of an existing system of laws "against the background of which legal language
obtains its meaningfulness .... In reading individual pieces of legislation, some
of us, more than others, recognize that context and its implications. But with respect
to ordinary terms used in more or less their common sense in legislation, the
community context-i.e., the habits and understandings shared by the larger
community-probably exerts more influence on a layman's understanding of a
statutory term that the law-related context. For example, we may share a similar,
though not identical, understanding of the meaning of words and phrases like food,
homeless person, and motor vehicle. 142 Our understanding of those terms depends
less on the law-related context in which they appear in legislation than on
community conventions. We may differ among ourselves at the margins of
application of those terms; definitions that clarify what peripheral referents might be
either incorporated in or excluded from the term's ordinary meaning serve a valid
communicative purpose.
"Motor vehicle" is defined on several occasions in the U.S. Code. 143 The Internal
Revenue Code specifies that motor vehicles must have four wheels.'" At least for
tax purposes, motorcycles are not motor vehicles. Title 18, on the other hand, which
139 Marmor, supra note 98, at 2 ("[S]peakers' ability to convey communicative content that
goes beyond what they say typically depends on two main factors: a relatively rich contextual
background that is common knowledge between the conversational parties, and certain norms
that apply to the conversational interaction."); Schauer, supra note, 90, at 526-27 ("Members
of the community of English speakers ... possess shared understandings that enable them to
talk to all other members of the community.").
140 Schauer, supra note 90, at 526-27 ("Members of the community of English speakers...
possess shared understandings that enable them to talk to all other members of the
community"); Cowart, supra note 13, at 508 ("The participants in the conversation must be
communicating within a similar linguistic framework and be capable of adequately
performing the duties of speaker/hearer."); see also Andrea Bianchi, Textual Interpretation
and (International) Law Reading: The Myth of (In)determinacy and the Genealogy of
Meaning, in MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAW WORK IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF DETLEV VAGTS 51 (P. Bekker et al, eds., 2010) ("Only within a community is
communication possible.").
141 CA, supra note 73, at 15.
142 All of these terms are defined in the U.S. Code, some on several occasions. For
definitions of "food," see supra note 68. "Homeless person" is defined in 42 U.S.C.A §
11302 (West 2012). For definitions of "motor vehicle," see infra note 143.
141 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 5519 (West 2012); 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2821, 6781 (West 2012); 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 31, 47, 2311 (West 2012); 23 U.S.C.A. §§ 154, 157, 405 (West 2012); 26
U.S.C.A. §§ 30, 30B, 30D, 179A, 6323 (West 2012); 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 102, 17101, 17501
(West 2012); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7550 (West 2012); 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 13102, 14301, 30102, 30301,
31301, 32101, 33112 (West 2012).
'44 See 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 30B, 30D (West 2012).
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covers crimes and criminal procedure, explicitly includes motorcycles within one of
its definitions of a motor vehicle,'45 and a second definition of motor vehicle in Title
18 is so broad that motorcycles clearly fall within its scope.' 46 At least so long as
these definitions do not contradict an ordinary understanding of the phrase or
incorporate within the term's scope something unfamiliar, these three definitions-
different as they are-successfully communicate what the legislative context cannot.
Ordinarily we understand a speaker "on the [basis] of what it would make sense for
the speaker to communicate in the circumstances." '147 As there is no back-and-forth
among legislative speaker and audience that can establish a shared understanding,
the statutory definition allows the speaker to clarify the scope of a term's meaning
and ensure that its audience understands the intended message.
A second component of context involves the individual's "internal context'
4 1 -
the sum of a person's life experiences and knowledge, reflected in his or her
individual use of language, that determine the associations triggered by particular
terms.149 One person's private meaning will never completely match another's, but,
in most communicative contexts, it makes little difference. And, in many legislative
contexts as well, the fact that the contours of individual meaning fail to match
exactly is of no import.
The person who said that a "community is defined by its language," also
suggested that "all of our languages are different; none are identical," and that
"language has an ineradicably individual character."' 50 Legislation, on the other
hand, is essentially public in nature. While statutory definitions cannot be expected
to resolve discrepancies among private meaning (nor would we want them to), what
those definitions might do is establish a shared mental space, in which lawmakers
and those subject to laws are consistently informed of the ground rules for
interpretation and application. By so announcing intention and meaning to the world
at large, the statutory definition may also reduce the gap between the expert's
understanding of a term and the layperson's.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 includes definitions for both "broker" and
"dealer,''. words that connote a variety of referents in ordinary speech and whose
"' 18 U.S.C.A. § 47 (West 2012) ("The term 'motor vehicle' includes an automobile,
automobile truck, automobile wagon, motorcycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle designed
for running on land.").
146 18 U.S.C.A. § 31 (West 2012) ("The term 'motor vehicle' means every description of
carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for
commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and
property, or property or cargo.").
147 See Marmor, supra note 98, at 6.
148 Bianchi, supra note 140, at 41.
149 Johnson, supra note 72, at 296 ("[T]he message to be comprehended (of which context
is an inextricable part) stimulates, triggers, or otherwise engages something that is already a
part of the message receiver-that is, the comprehender's knowledge.").
150 White, supra note 29, at 1962, 1974.
'' 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c (West 2012). ("(4) The term 'broker' means any person engaged in
the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.... (5) The term
'dealer' means any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for such
person's own account through a broker or otherwise.").
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meanings may often overlap. Apart from provisions that speak exclusively to banks,
both definitions are concise and clear (although not precise or detailed). And, the
two definitions together clearly distinguish the meaning of one term from that of the
other. Both definitions serve a performative function as well as a communicative
one, as qualifying as either a broker or dealer brings with it certain obligations and
privileges. From a communication perspective, the two definitions work well; each
succinctly sets forth what it is that distinguishes the work of, respectively, a broker
or a dealer, and establishes the ground rules for an elaborate regulatory structure that
governs the activities of those agents.
In most communicative contexts, we assume that participants in a dialogue are
cooperating and that they share at least some common goals,'52 whether those
involve a sincere exchange of information, the cementing of a relationship, the
encouragement of changes in behavior or taking of action, or some other mutually
desired outcome. As the ends sought by communicants diverge, the quality of
communication suffers. We cannot assume that the legislative speaker and its
audience are cooperative; they may each envision very different outcomes from
legislation.' To the extent that Congress and the governed share a common
understanding and appreciation of the policies furthered by statute, the legislative
communication is more likely to be successful,'54 and the meanings of terms used in
legislation more apt to be similarly understood. Our courtrooms and boardrooms,
however, are filled with individuals whose goal is, in fact, to circumvent legislative
norms and policy. If explicitly disambiguating or otherwise clarifying the meanings
of terms used in legislation might impede the willful evasion of the statute, then
incorporating definitions into the statutory text might be worthwhile.'55
The Internal Revenue Code allows deductions-i.e., privileges-for interest paid
in connection with "property held for investment."' 56 Deductions are good for
152 See Sidoka Gizir & Hasan Simsek, Communication in an Academic Context, 50 HIGHER
EDUCATION 197, 209 (2005). Studying the communication patterns in an academic institution,
the authors found a lack of common goals was one factor that caused a deterioration in
communication.
153 Marmor, supra note 98, at 19, 24. Marmor characterizes legislation as a "non-
cooperative form of communication" and a "different kind of conversation."
154 See SOLAN, supra note 11, at 5-12. Solan notes that most laws work well because they
conform to our expectations of what is appropriate. "Most of the time ... the rules work so
well that the possibility of concocting unusual situations in which they do not provide
unequivocal answers goes unnoticed. That is generally true of laws that codify social norms.
It is less true of laws that attempt to regulate behavior in ways that are counterintuitive or in
ways in which people would rather not conform." Id. at 11.
'55 See Maley, supra note 12, at 36 (quoting an 1891 English case) ("[I]t is not enough to
attain a degree of precision which a person reading in good faith can understand, but it is
necessary to attain if possible to a degree of precision which a person reading in bad faith
cannot misunderstand. It is all the better if he cannot pretend to misunderstand it. ([1891] 1
Queen's Bench 149, 167 per Stephen J.)").
156 26 U.S.C.A. § 163 (West 2012) ("The term 'property held for investment' shall
include--(i) any property which produces income of a type described in section 469(e)(1), and
(ii) any interest held by a taxpayer in an activity involving the conduct of a trade or business-
(1) which is not a passive activity, and (II) with respect to which the taxpayer does not
materially participate.").
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taxpayers; we would expect arguments for the inclusion of all sorts of property
interests within the scope of that phrase. Defining "property held for investment" to
explicitly exclude interests in passive undertakings (defined in yet another section of
the Internal Revenue Code157) efficiently eliminates one possible misreading (at least
as Congress intended it) of the statute.
Willful misinterpretation of speech or text implies a less than successful
communication. A communication is productive when the response of one
participant to another's speech is appropriate and expected. When responses are
unanticipated, either what was intended to be communicated was misunderstood or
the parties to the communication did not share similar objectives in communicating.
To the extent that there is a response or reaction to a communication, the success or
failure of the speech can be assessed. But legislative communication may provoke
little immediate reaction or feedback. If the goal of the statutory message is to
influence behavior (as it usually is), the impact of the legislative text is not
immediately measurable. Indicia of communicative success or failure in the
legislative context may be a long time in coming. As the effects of legislation play
out, legislators may see a need to tighten statutory language, close loopholes, or
clarify the statute's application. Defining or redefining the meaning of terms may
allow the legislature to do just that. 5 '
From a communication perspective, definitions might be usefully included in
legislative text in order to enrich context, establish a shared frame of reference, and
overcome, at least to some extent, the lack of immediate feedback normally
associated with communicative exchanges. With those interests in mind, how might
statutory definitions best be drafted in order to fill whatever gaps exist in legislative
communication?
The context of ordinary speech allows immediate disambiguation of words
having more than one distinctive meaning. And, little, if any, clarification is
ordinarily required in legislation to disambiguate among radically different meanings
of a term. The context, even in legislation, will make it clear whether we are talking
about financial institutions or riverbeds when we refer to banks. What legislative
context can rarely accomplish, though, is refinement of meaning with respect to an
often-used term. The statutory definition can clarify what we mean when we use a
term like "child," by indicating whether the focus is on the attribute of age, the
relationship to a parent figure, the characteristic of dependence on others for
financial or physical well-being, or some combination of all of the foregoing.'59 A
157 26 U.S.C.A. § 469 (West 2012).
158 Robert Cooter & Tom Ginsburg, Leximetrics: Why the Same Laws are No longer in
Some Countries than Others 24 (June 2003) (University of Illinois Law & Economics
Research Paper No. LE03-012), available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=456520. Cooter
and Ginsburg examine the length and specificity of legislation across jurisdictions and across
languages. One of the questions left open in their paper goes to the specificity of legislation
over time. Cooter and Ginsburg wonder whether legislative amendments always add
specificity to statutes or whether there are times when the legislature, in a delegatory mood,
decides to give greater discretionary authority to administrative agencies, and amend the
statute so that is less specific.
159 For example, some definitions of "child" focus only on the age of the individual (see,
e.g., 15 § U.S.C.A. 6501 (West 2012): "The term 'child' means an individual under the age of
13"); others highlight the nature of the relationship between the child and the parent (see, e.g.,
12 U.S.C.A. § 1707 (West 2012): "The term 'child' means, with respect to a mortgagor under
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definition that directs the reader's attention to what it is about child-ishness that
matters in the context of the statute's message should allow the legislative audience
to appreciate the import and intention behind normative provisions that include the
term "child."
Similarly, definitions that quickly establish that particular fringe instances of
terms are meant to be either included in or excluded from the terms' scope also work
to establish a context. The definition of "human organ" in section 274e of Title 42
of the U.S. Code raises any number of problems from other perspectives, but at least
it makes clear that the term encompasses fetal organs:
The term "human organ" means the human (including fetal) kidney, liver,
heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any
subpart thereof and any other human organ (or any subpart thereof,
including that derived from a fetus) specified by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services by regulation. 6 °
Sometimes, a definition quickly and simply clarifies meaning, without at all
encumbering it. For example, one section of the U.S. Code defines "ocean energy"
to include current, wave, and tidal energy, and to exclude thermal energy.16'
A definition that "presupposes, rather than displaces"'16 2 ordinary meaning and
clarifies the scope of the term's application works to enrich the message and ensure
that the communicants are interacting on a level field of play. On the other hand,
definitions that do nothing more than restate the ordinary meaning of a term serve
little purpose, and may even detract from the communicative function served by the
statute. 163
such section, a son, stepson, daughter, or stepdaughter of such mortgagor"); and still others
depend on the absence of financial independence (see, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 8441(4) (West
2012): the term 'child' means ... (b) such unmarried dependent child regardless of age who is
incapable of self-support because of mental or physical disability incurred before age 18").
160 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e (West 2012). Whether we usually understand bones and skin, and
parts of organs to be included within the phrase "human organs" is one question. But more
troubling is the fact that this definition of human organ sits just three sections away from
another definition of "organ," also falling within the part of Title 42 named "organ
transplants" that explicitly excludes comeas and eyes from the compass of the word.
According to section 274b of Title 42, "the term 'organ' means the human kidney, liver, heart,
lung, pancreas, and any other human organ (other than comeas and eyes) specified by the
Secretary by regulation and for purposes of section 274a of this title, such term includes bone
marrow." Section 274e was first enacted in 1984, and the references to fetal organs added by
amendment in 1988. Section 274b was also enacted in 1984, and amended in 1988, but those
1988 amendments made no changes to the definition of organ. Whether these differences in
definition are purposeful or not, there is little that can be said for having two explicitly
different definitions of two very similar terms in the same part of the same chapter.
"6 42 U.S.C.A. § 17282 (West 2012).
162 See CAO, supra note 73, at 107, and her description of non-exhaustive definitions: "non-
exhaustive definitions presuppose rather than displace the meaning that a defined term would
bear in ordinary usage."
163 FILSON & STROKOFF, supra note 4, at 129: "a definition should never recite the obvious.
it would be unnecessary and might create doubts about the meaning of other familiar
words."
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Definitions of common and well-understood terms may interfere with our
engagement with a text. As presumably competent language users, we are usually
able to understand common words and phrases without reference to glossaries. Each
of our individual uses of language relates to our own experience; our language use
and word choice reflect that categorization of experience. Our conceptual categories
are in a constant state of flux as each of us reacts to new situations and experiences,
and incorporates those stimuli and events into our individual cognitive systems.64
Cognition-and the language use that results from it-is an "adaptive function"; ' 61 it
is above all not passive, but, rather is an "active accomplishment"; 6 and it involves
assimilation and accommodation. 67 But all of these processes are both gradual and
internal and unique to the individual. Incorporating a definition into a text creates
static; the reader is instructed as to how a word or phrase should be interpreted. The
reader must somehow fit that explicit meaning into his or her own understanding of
the term. The greater the discrepancy between the term's statutory definition and the
reader's existing understanding, the more substantial the readjustment required of the
reader.
Defining the word "person" to include corporations, partnerships, associations,
and other entities, as so many statutory definitions do,168 raises obvious opportunities
for misunderstandings. But, for those who interact frequently with legislative text,
that kind of definition may be less problematic. That particular audience has come
to understand "person" to include, in a legislative context, a wide range of inhuman
entities."' But when a definition runs very far afield from both an ordinary
understanding of a word and a specialized meaning, credulity is strained and our
understanding of the statute's normative provisions can be significantly impaired.
Chapter 39 of Title 22 (Foreign Relations and Intercourse) of the U.S. Code deals
with arms exports control. The definitional section of the subchapter addressing
missiles and missile equipment defines "person" as follows:
164 White, supra note 29, at 1979, 1980: "our categories and terms are perpetually losing
and acquiring meaning ... they mean differently to different people and in different texts." In
this passage, White was discussing the "literary use of language" and suggesting that "law is
naturally literary."
165 Von Glaserfeld, supra note 91, at 125.
166 Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, Cognition as a Residual Category in
Anthropology, 7 ANNUAL REV. IN ANT1HROPOLOGY 51, 53 (1978).
167 Von Glaserfeld, supra note 91, at 136: "Knowledge is never acquired passively, because
novelty cannot be handled except through assimilation to a cognitive structure the
experiencing subject already has. Indeed, the subject does not perceive an experience as novel
until it generates a perturbation relative to some unexpected result. Only at that point the
experience may lead to an accommodation and thus to a novel conceptual structure that re-
establishes a relative equilibrium."
168 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C.A. § 431 (West 2012), 5 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West 2012), 7 U.S.C.A. §
15b (2012), and 18 U.S.C.A. § 224 (West 2012).
169 But while we might expect the term "person" to include corporations, partnerships, and
the like in a business context (e.g., securities, bankruptcy, banking), we would probably be
surprised to learn that, even in a criminal context, it could include entities as well. See the
definitions section of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, codified at 18
U.S.C.A. § 1961 (West 2012): "(3) 'person' includes any individual or entity capable of
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."
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(A) the term "person" means a natural person as well as a corporation,
business association, partnership, society, trust, any other
nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, and any governmental
entity operating as a business enterprise, and any successor of any such
entity; and
(B) in the case of countries with non-market economies (excluding former
members of the Warsaw Pact), the term "person" means-
(i) all activities of that government relating to the development or
production of any missile equipment or technology; and
(ii) all activities of that government affecting the development or
production of electronics, space systems or equipment, and military
aircraft. 7 °
Throughout the six sections that comprise that subchapter, every reference to
"person" brings within its scope this strange assortment of individuals, entities, and,
most curiously, activities. This is a very different definition of "person" than that
which simply includes businesses and professional organizations. That definition is
relatively simple, as it includes within its scope just about any formally organized
group. The definition of "person" in the foreign relations context, by contrast, is
next to impossible to encapsulate. Almost constant reference to the definition would
be required to understand the normative provisions in which the definition applies.
More likely, the definition, in all its complexity, will simply be ignored. Even
among an audience with particular expertise, it is hard to see any merit in defining
such a common term so differently from its ordinary meaning. Anyone reading the
text of the legislation-layperson and expert alike-would be hard pressed to
incorporate such a peculiar meaning into the statute's content.
The job of the statutory definition is to establish a public meaning for a term.
Private meanings and individual connotations associated with a term must somehow
coalesce, or give way to a public one that is easily accepted by a variety of readers.
To the extent that any statutory definition of an ordinarily used term strays far from
its common or established meaning, the definition will require a greater readjustment
and realignment of private meaning categories; that realignment will make
acceptance of the statutory definition more difficult. Ideally, statutory definitions
should parallel ordinary meaning, while clarifying the scope of that meaning in
questionable or hard cases.17
170 22 U.S.C.A. § 2797c (West 2012).
171 Soames, supra note 98, at 1. Soames distinguishes between "genuinely" and
"semantically" hard cases:
I will call a legal case genuinely hard iff its (legally correct) outcome is not
determined by all nonlegal and nonmoral facts plus the linguistically-based content of
the relevant legal texts-including everything asserted and conveyed therein. These
cases divide into three types: (i) those in which the texts say too little to produce any
result, (ii) those in which the texts are inconsistent, and thus generate contradictory
results, and (iii) those in which the texts yield a single result, which is, paradoxically,
legally incorrect. In a genuinely hard case, a correct outcome can be reached only by
an innovative judicial decision-which, effectively, creates new law. In contrast, a
case is semantically hard iff the meanings of the relevant legal texts, plus all nonlegal
and nonmoral facts, fail to determine its (legally correct) outcome. The distinction
between semantically, and genuinely, hard cases turns on the distinction between the
semantic contents of legal texts and their complete, linguistically-based contents.
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The point is hardly a new one. Hirsch and Filson, both writing on legislative
drafting, mention the "drag" of a word's ordinary meaning. 17 2 Dickerson conjures
the specter of accepted use with which the definition must contend: "Like ghosts
returning to a haunted house, established connotations return to haunt the user who
attempts to banish them."' 73  Dickerson goes on to suggest that it is next to
impossible for a drafter to cause his reader to cancel the engrained emotion of a word
for another." '174 As early as 1929, an article in the Harvard Law Review, playing off
Holmes' characterization of words,'75 noted that "words are certainly not crystals,
but they are after all not portmanteaus ... We can not quite put anything we like
into them."' 76
Many legislative drafting texts describe efficiencies realized when defined terms
stand for complicated concepts. Investing terms with complex meanings that they
then carry with them throughout a particular statutory provision might indeed
simplify a text and avoid inconsistencies.'77 But, as tempting as it might be to invest,
through definition, ordinary terms with significance that they might not otherwise
enjoy, the costs, in terms of burdens placed on the understandability of a term, may
well outweigh the benefits.
Definitions such as that of "food" in 7 U.S.C. § 2012178 plague the reader. That
definition, which applies to all twenty-six sections within its chapter, specifically
excludes items within the ordinary meaning of the term (e.g., hot foods) and includes
others not usually associated with the term (e.g., chewing gum and seeds). Likewise,
definitions of "employee" that include applicants and former employees are equally
likely to be either ignored or forgotten as a reader interacts with the statute's
substantive provisions. 179 If remembered, the definition does nothing to make the
statute more understandable; instead, the reader must always remind herself that the
no-longer- and not-ever-employed are covered by the statute. In any event, the
legitimacy of the statute is undermined.'
Id.
172 FILSON & STROKOFF, supra note 4, at 136 ("the drag of its original meaning"), and
HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 30 ("the drag of a word's normal meaning").
173 DICKERSON, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 4, at 143.
174 Id. at 143 (quoting RICHARD ROBINSON, DEFINITION 7 (1950)).
175 "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought
and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in
which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
176 Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863, 866 (1930)
177 FILSON & STROKOFF, supra note 4, at 129: a definition "promotes internal consistency,
... avoids clutter, .. .promotes readability and drafting economy," and DORSEY, supra note 4,
at 221: "a definition saves you from stating a complicated concept over and over; it allows
you to package the concept in a simple term and use that term repeatedly."
178 See supra note 101.
179 See supra notes 25 and 66.
180 Kristen Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories and Compliance in the
Regulatory State, 94 MINN. L. REv. 1151, 1182: "Regulated parties are most likely to perceive
the law as legitimate when acts or conditions that seem to be similar in all salient respects
yield the same legal consequences, and will be more skeptical of laws whose seemingly
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On the other hand, creating a term out of whole cloth and investing it with
meaning may make sense in terms of both drafting efficiency and understandability.
A wholly new term created solely to fit the purposes of the statute brings with it no
baggage81-no existing cognitive categories to be muddied.
Legislative drafters might recognize as well the impossibility of complete and
exhaustive definition.'82 From a communications perspective, an exhaustive
definition is seldom required; meaning need only be made clear enough for the
purpose at hand. A definition is "the substitution for the symbol to be defined by a
symbol or symbols that can be better understood."' 83 Understandability, though, is
different from certainty in application. The words used in the definition-either
alone or together-may clarify a term's meaning without necessarily imparting any
more certainty in application than the defined term itself. While a descriptive
definition can clarify, disambiguate, and explicitly either exclude or include
marginal cases, it cannot solidify meaning, altogether eliminate fringe meanings or
close the periphery of a term's scope. 84 Even when a term is defined by necessary
and sufficient conditions, the expression of the conditions themselves has
prototypical and fringe applications. Definitions that purport to be exhaustive, either
by enumerating a set of necessary and sufficient conditions or by listing qualifying
instances, rarely close the door on meaning. 85
Though legislators may wish to encourage particular behaviors among a statute's
audience, they cannot completely anticipate either the audience's reactions or the
ordinary terms encompass an odd assemblage of dissimilar items that do not so obviously
warrant the same treatment."
181 See FILSON & STROKOFF, supra note 4, at 133 which refers to the advisability of
sometimes not defining words that "carry with them too much baggage."
182 See Vijay Bhatia, Cognitive Structuring in Legislative Provisions, in LANGUAGE AND
THE LAW 137 (John Gibbons ed., 1994). Bhatia remarks upon the tendencies of legislativedraftsmen to "attempt to define their model world of obligations and rights, permissions andprohibitions as precisely, clearly and unambiguously as linguistic resources permit. Another
factor which further complicates their task is that they deal with a universe of human
behavior, which is unrestricted in the sense that it is impossible to predict exactly what may
happen within it."
183 See Glanville Williams, Language and the Law-IV, 61 THE L. QUARTERLY REv., 384,
386 (1945), reprinted in LAW AND LANGUAGE 145 (Frederick Schauer ed., 1993) (referring to
the definition of definition formulated by C. K. Ogden and I.A. Richards in THE MEANING OF
MEANING (1928)--"definition is the substitution for the symbol to be defined of a symbol or
symbols that can be better understood.").
184 See Williams, supra note 183, at 138. Glanville distinguishes between fringe and
multiple meanings and suggests that definition may resolve problems associated with multiple
meanings, it is unlikely to provide any certainty with respect to fringe meaning.
185 See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010), where the court
addressed the definition of "material support or resources" set forth in 18 U.S.C. §2339A(b)(1). See also, McNeill v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2218 (2011), where the definition
of "serious drug offense" in 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) is discussed and the Court considers
the use of present, as opposed to past tense, in the statement of the definition. Finally, see
Justice Sotomayor's dissent in Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 130 S. Ct.
2433 (2010), where she notes that a literal reading of a statute's definition of"railroad" (in 49
U.S.C. § 10102(6)(A)) would "render a truck a railroad."
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environment that will affect the statute's application. Definitions that serve
primarily communicative functions should not be so closed, or so rigidly construct
boundaries around the scope of a term that the definitions work to foreclose
unexpected applications of the statute's normative provisions. In his 1988 article on
formalism, Schauer discusses constraints on application and interpretation that
follow from particular linguistic choices in law.' 6 In his discussion of Lochner v.
New York,'87 Schauer suggests that Justice Peckham's refusal to recognize "the
political, moral, social and economic choices"' 8 8 at stake in the decision rests on
Peckham's understanding of the meaning of a single term-liberty:
What strikes us clearly as a political or social or moral or economic
choice is described in Lochner as definitionally incorporated within the
meaning of a broad term. Thus, choice is masked by the language of
linguistic inexorability.'89
Schauer moves from linguistic to definitional inexorability. Referring not
necessarily to definitions incorporated into the text of statutes, but to word meaning
more generally (e.g., the undefinable "property"), Schauer states, "a decisionmaker
who knows or should know that . . . a choice is open, but treats the choice as no
more available than the choice to treat a pelican as other than a bird, is charged with
formalism for treating as definitionally inexorable that which involves
nondefinitional, substantive choices."' 9
From a communications perspective, we want to avoid definitional inexorability;
we do not want the definition's text to inappropriately foreclose choices that should
otherwise exist in the application of a statute's normative provisions. To cause a
definition that serves a primarily communicative function to wag the dog, so to
speak, elevates it to a significance that overshadows the statute's norms and may
frustrate the statute's policies.
The meanings of words and phrases we employ in successful communications
are no more static and inert than the experiences they describe. Definitively closing
the meaning of a term in a legislative communication that endures over some period
of time may in fact impair the effectiveness of both the communication and the
statute itself.
From a communications perspective, we want definitions to fill the gap
occasioned by the absence of a rich context and shared experience and expertise.
We want everyone on the same page, using words and phrases in a similar (though
probably not identical) manner. To the extent that a definition gets us to that point
by either clarifying what is or is not included or encouraging us to focus on what is
186 Schauer, supra note 90, at 510: "Formalism is the way in which rules achieve their
'ruleness' precisely by doing what is supposed to be the failing of formalism: screening off
from a decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise take into
account. Moreover, it appears that this screening off takes place largely through the force of
the language in which rules are written. Thus the tasks performed by rules are tasks for which
the primary tool is the specific linguistic formulation of a rule."
187 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
188 Schauer, supra note 90, at 511.
189 Id. at 512.
190 Id. at 512-13.
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important about a thing or event (rather than rigidly constraining meaning), a
statutory definition can be useful.
C. Making Speech Acts Work
In ordinary conversation or text, rarely do words alone effect substantive change.
But sometimes, as we interact with others, we consent to something or make a
promise. That consent or promise may be manifested in language, a gesture, or even
silence-depending on the context and the participants in the exchange-but the
effect of promising or consenting is, in the one case, to obligate and, in the other, to
authorize. That particular speech or gesture, or lack of same, has an effect-it
changes the relationship among the parties and invests one with either a
responsibility or a privilege.
Other language used in particular settings and rites implicate a set of rules and
conventions that, when applied to actors, objects, or states of affairs, brings about a
change in status. A baseball umpire calls a runner out; a minister pronounces a
couple husband and wife; a priest absolves a penitent of sins; a dignitary christens a
vessel-all of these utterances have real and concrete effects. The success-or
failure--of speech in effecting change depends on the authority of the speaker, the
context in which the speech occurs, and the utterance itself. The heckler's shouts
from the stands calling the runner safe have as little effect as my attempts to marry a
couple or absolve a confessor of sins.
Speech or text that has the "character of action"'' is a topic well discussed
among philosophers and linguists. J. L. Austin and John Searle have written often
and at length on "performative utterances"-declarations that change the status,
entitlements, or obligations of the speaker or the audience. 92 While a speech act
certainly serves a communicative function, what distinguishes it, and ultimately
overwhelms its communicative role, is its transformative impact on an existing state
of affairs or on the participants in the speech.
Language used in law-related contexts often effects substantive change: it can
impose sanctions, invest an individual with entitlements or impairments, and cause
an event to have concrete and predictable consequences. H. L. Hart noted that
"sentences of legal language differ in meaning, import, and effect (or all three)
depending on who utters them, where, and when."' 93 Legislative text, enacted in
conformity with proper procedures and law, is vested with an authority and impact
that allows it to be enforced. If legislation communicates, so does it perform; it
sanctions some behaviors and rewards others.
If all statutory definitions serve a communicative purpose, some serve
performative functions as well; in many of those cases, it is the definition's role as a
speech act that allows the statute's normative provisions to accomplish the
legislative goal. The effect of naming by definition, and the resulting assignment of
rights and obligations to named entities, may well overshadow any communicative
purpose served by the definition. As statutory definitions create categories of
191 Barry Smith, Towards a History of Speech Act Theory, in SPEECH ACTS, MEANINGS,
AND INTENTIONS: CRITICAL APPROACHES TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN R. SEARLE 29 (A.
Burkhardt ed., 1990).
192 See supra note 13.
193 Morrison, supra note 80, at 293 (quoting H. L. Hart, Definition and Theory in
Jurisprudence, 70 L. QUARTERLY REv. 37, 43, 44 (1954)).
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instances to which the statute's normative provisions apply or as they deem
particular types of behavior to warrant certain treatment, definitions invest those
instances and behaviors with rights and obligations that they would not otherwise
have. The definitions solidify a status that brings with it entitlements. 
194
Atienza, echoing Hart, suggests that all legal authority consists of two kinds of
rules - those that create sanctions, obligations or benefits (i.e., normative rules) and
those that confer power.' 95 From one perspective, the statutory definition-at least
when its role is predominantly performative-is all about power. Legislation can,
through definition, cause words to represent whatever its drafters decree; there is a
certain "freedom of stipulation,"' 96 and a power exerted by legislators through
definition. While definitions rarely mandate behavior, impose obligations, or bestow
privileges, they do serve as guideposts that indicate how those benefits might be
obtained or how those obligations avoided. By conforming to a definition's terms,
the governed may benefit or otherwise gain advantage. Or, falling within the scope
of a definition may result in sanctions. The definition may, in fact, provide a means
to either obtain or avoid certain ends.
197
Chapter 1 of Title 7 of the U.S. Code governs commodity exchanges; parts of
that chapter exempt some commodities from regulation. But even transactions in
exempt commodities may be subject to other provisions of Chapter 1 unless one or
more of the participants in the transaction qualifies as an "eligible commercial
entity."' 98 Being named and qualifying as an "eligible commercial entity" brings
194 See id. at 296, describing the meaning of a term (in this case, H. L. Hart's "limited
company") as set forth in rules of law: "They [the rules of law] lay down the criteria for
something counting as a company by laying down, in a sense, the proper modes of speaking;
in so laying down the criteria, they effectuate a categorization."
'9' ATIENZA & MANERO, supra note 64, at 44.
196 DICKERSON, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 4, at 140-44.
197 ATiENZA & MANERO, supra note 64, at 59: "If state of affairs X obtains and Z performs
action Y, then institutional result (or normative change) R is produced"); see also Hickman &
Hill, supra note 180, at 1156 ("law often emphasizes certainty and encourages planning by
providing detailed roadmaps of necessary and sufficient conditions for achieving particular
legal consequences").
198 7 U.S.C.A. § la(17) (West 2012):
The term "eligible commercial entity" means, with respect to an agreement, contract or
transaction in a commodity-
(A) an eligible contract participant described in clause (i), (ii), (v) , (vii), (viii), or (ix)
of paragraph (12)(A) that, in connection with its business-a
(i) has a demonstrable ability, directly or through separate contractual
arrangements, to make or take delivery of the underlying commodity;
(ii) incurs risks, in addition to price risk, related to the commodity; or
(iii) is a dealer that regularly provides risk management or hedging
services to, or engages in market-making activities with, the foregoing
entities involving transactions to purchase or sell the commodity or
derivative agreements, contracts, or transactions in the commodity;
(B) an eligible contract participant, other than a natural person or an instrumentality,
department, or agency of a State or local governmental entity, that-
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with it advantages set forth in the statute. There is no such thing as an eligible
commercial entity apart from the statute; the definition reifies something that
otherwise would not exist. It is only by means of a definition that identifies, and, in
fact, creates, such a creature that the statute's normative provisions can be applied.And it is only by means of qualifying as such a thing pursuant to the statutory
definition that a commodity trader may remove itself from the requirements of
federal regulation.
In a criminal context, an individual who takes actions that fall within thedefinition of a "forest trespass"'" is subject to penalties. The definition names andidentifies a set of activities and behaviors; the statute's normative provisions
establish the consequences triggered upon the attachment of the definition to a state
of affairs.
Terms that are statutorily defined and that function as speech acts run the gamut
from words and phrases with many meanings to terms whose common meaning is
well-accepted and to purely invented and otherwise nonsensical terms.
The meaning of the word "dealer" depends on context; we can imagine dealers of
arms, cars, cards, and drugs, and also recognize specialized uses of the word in the
context of securities, commodities, and other commercial transactions. In the United
States Code, the word "dealer," standing alone, is defined at least sixteen times in
contexts as varied as agriculture, securities, crimes, tax, accounting, and
transportation.2" With respect to some of those definitions, being named as a
(i) regularly enters into transactions to purchase or sell the commodity
or derivative agreements, contracts, or transactions in the commodity;
and
(ii) either-
(I) in the case of a collective investment vehicle whose
participants include persons other than-a
(aa) qualified eligible persons, as defined in
Commission rule 4.7(a);
(bb) accredited investors, as defined in Regulation
D of the Securities and Exchange Commission
under the Securities Act of 1933, with total assets
of $2,000,000; or
(cc) qualified purchasers, as defined in section
2(a)(5 1)(A) of the Investment Company Act of
1940;
in each case as in effect on December 21, 2000, has, or is
one of a group of vehicles under common control or
management having in the aggregate, $1,000,000,000 in
total assets; or(II) in the case of other persons, has, or is one of a group of
persons under common control or management having in
the aggregate, $100,000,000 in total assets; or(C) such other persons as the Commission shall determine appropriate and shall
designate by rule, regulation, or order.
9 25 U.S.C.A. § 3103 (West 2012).
200 7 U.S.C.A. § 701 (West 2012); 7 U.S.C.A. § 499a (West 2012); 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(West 2012); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c (West 2012); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1231 (West 2012); 15 U.S.C.A.§ 7220 (West 2012); 18 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West 2012); 18 U.S.C.A. § 921 (West 2012); 26U.S.C.A. § 901 (West 2012); 26 U.S.C.A. § 5121 (West 2012); 26 U.S.C.A. § 5845 (West2012); 26 U.S.C.A. § 6412 (West 2012); 42 U.S.C.A. § 7550 (West 2012); 49 U.S.C.A. §
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dealer-whether it be of livestock, securities, weapons, distilled spirits, or motor
vehicles-brings with it obligations or benefits. Those who fall within the definition
of dealer may be required to register with designated federal authorities;
20
' they may
be prohibited from undertaking activities that non-dealers are free to engage 
in;202
they may be exempt from obligations that attach to others;20
3 or they may benefit
from privileges accorded only to their class.20 4
The forms and styles of those performative "dealer" definitions are as varied as
the attributes that distinguish instances falling within the definition's scope. Some
definitions establish a set of conditions, each one of which must be satisfied in order
for an iteration to be deemed a dealer. The Sarbanes Oxley definition of dealer is
closely related to the Securities Exchange Act definition of dealer, but is more
restrictive as it attaches two additional conditions to the Securities Exchange Act
definition. 2 5 To qualify as a dealer under Sarbanes Oxley, an entity must satisfy
three conditions: it must meet the Securities Exchange Act definition of dealer (17
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)); it must be required to file financial statements under other
provisions of Sarbanes Oxley; and those financial statements must be required, by
other statutory provisions, to be certified by an accountant.
Becoming a dealer under Sarbanes Oxley brings with it an obligation; becoming
a dealer effects a change, not only in the dealer's own behavior, but in the behavior
or obligations of those that interact with it.206 The Sarbanes Oxley definition of
dealer is rigid; if only one of the three conditions set forth in the definition fails, the
instance avoids obligations assigned to qualifying dealers.
By way of contrast, the definition of dealer set forth in Title 18 is much more
open. Nevertheless, those who fall within its porous borders may become subject to
licensing requirements and are prohibited from engaging in activities permissible for
non-dealers:
The term "dealer" means
30102 (West 2012); 49 U.S.C.A. § 32304 (West 2012); and 49 U.S.C.A. § 32908 (West
2012).
201 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 203, 701 (West 2012).
202 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77b, 78c (West 2012).
203 26 U.S.C.A. § 5121 (West 2012).
204 26 U.S.C.A. § 6412 (West 2012).
205 15 U.S.C.A. § 7220 (West 2012). "The term 'dealer' means a dealer (as such term is
defined in section 78c(a)(5) of this title) that is required to file a balance sheet, income
statement, or other financial statement under section 78q(e)(1)(A) of this title, where such
balance sheet, income statement, or financial statement is required to be certified by a
registered public accounting firm."
206 Some Sarbanes Oxley provisions impose obligations on the dealers themselves (e.g., the
"accounting support fee" referenced in 15 U.S.C.A. § 7219(h) (West 2012)). Other sections
speak to potential burdens, not on dealers themselves, but on accounting firms that certify or
otherwise review the financial condition of dealers (e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 7214 (West 2012)
which provides that the Public Accounting Oversight Board may conduct inspections of
public accounting firms that audit brokers and dealers (as defined in Sarbanes Oxley/Dodd
Frank).).
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(A) any person engaged in the business of selling firearms at
wholesale or retail,
(B) any person engaged in the business of repairing firearms or of
making or fitting special barrels, stocks, or trigger mechanisms to
firearms, or
(C) any person who is a pawnbroker." 7
Both these definitions of dealer-the one set forth in Sarbanes Oxley and the
other in Title 18-are associated with normative provisions that, rather than
conferring benefits, impose obligations on instances that fall within the definition's
scope. In one case, the definition's boundaries are more or less certain, while the
other describes a category that is fuzzy in outline.
If ambiguous terms like "dealer" can be statutorily defined to serve speech act
purposes, then so can commonly used words with established meanings.
"Employee" is defined repeatedly in the U.S. Code; in Title 5 alone, the word is
defined more than thirty times.20 8 Qualifying as an employee often brings with it
statutorily enumerated benefits; in other cases, obligations are imposed on those
individuals deemed to be employees. In section 4301 of Title 15, "employee" is
defined for the purposes of determining those individuals entitled to receive
performance evaluations. 0 9  That definition of employee begins by broadly
including all persons employed by federal agencies; it then excludes eight categories
of federal agency employees. Only those employees falling within the section 4301definition (i.e., all federal employees other than those specifically excluded) are
evaluated in accordance with section 4302 of Title 15 and afforded notice and other
protections in the event of an evaluation that reflects unacceptable performance.
Chapter 5 of Title 3 also bestows labor rights on particular federal employees.1 °
Here, it is the group of individuals employed by the offices of the president and by
the residences of the president and vice-president who are entitled to protection
against discrimination, family and medical leaves, and other rights vested by statute
in other groups of employees. The definitional scheme set forth in Chapter 5 is a
convoluted one: first, "employee" is defined to include applicants for employment
and former employees; then, "employing office" is deemed to refer to the offices of
the president and the residences of the president and vice-president; and, finally,
"covered employee" is defined as any employee of an employing office.21' While
"covered employees" are those to whom the rights attach, qualification as an
employee is a threshold to "covered employee" status. In the context of Chapter 5, a
common word-employee-is expanded quite beyond its ordinary sense (to include
both applicants and former employees), and then a narrower term-"covered
employee"--is defined by specifying the identity of the employer. By virtue of the
definition of employee, persons not ordinarily encompassed by the term (i.e.,
207 18 U.S.C.A. § 921 (West 2012).
201 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 2105, 3323, 3581, 4301, 4501, 4701, 5102, 5361, 5504, 5520a,5521, 5541, 5561, 5570, 5581, 5595, 5597, 5701, 5721, 5921, 6101, 6301, 6331, 6381, 7103,7322, 7342, 7501, 7511, 7541, 8101, 8311, 8331, 8701, 8901, 9001, 9801, 9902 (West 2012).
209 15 U.S.C.A. § 4301 (West 2012).
2,o 3 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq. (West 2012).
211 3 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West 2012).
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applicants and former employees) share rights conferred on more traditional
employees.
In the case of "employee," none of the definitions in the U.S. Code articulate
what it means to be employed; some variation of the verb "employ" is always used
to describe the characteristics of an employee. Instead, the definitions refine the idea
of employment by including or excluding particular types of individuals;
consequently, an individual's rights and obligations depend on whether he or she
falls within or outside of other categories enumerated in the definition. In the two
definitions of employee discussed above, the default is that "employees" benefit
from the rights conferred by the statute. It is only if the particular instance of
employee falls within one of the exceptions to the definition that the rights are not
conferred.
"Family fishermen" are similarly entitled to benefits under the Bankruptcy
Code.212  By contrast to definitions of "employee"-where a large group of
individuals is, by default, included and then that group reduced-the definition of
"family fisherman" is one that sets forth conditions that all instances must satisfy.
213
No one is a family fisherman unless each and every condition relating to ownership
and income set forth in the statue is met.
For terms wholly invented by statute, we would expect that their definitions, at
least insofar as they serve speech act functions, would be articulated by necessary
and sufficient conditions. Since we have no frame of reference for these invented
terms, how would we otherwise be able to determine what instances are entitled to
obligations conferred by statute or subject to sanctions imposed? Because we have
no experience in the use of these terms, we're not able to attach meaning to them.
214
If rights or sanctions are to be imposed on instances of those terms, the definition
should assign a fairly certain meaning that would enable interpreters to consistently
and reasonably determine what instances are included within the term's scope.
In many cases, a statute defines a number of terms all related to one another and
all pieces in a puzzle that, when assembled, reveals a regulatory structure. Those
defined terms, which usually serve performative functions, are often composed of
modifiers upon modifiers attached to other defined terms. The Internal Revenue
Code is full of otherwise meaningless terms (like "adjusted gross income,"
"modified adjusted gross income," "qualified appreciated stock," "3-year property,"
"5-year property," "amortizable section 197 intangible," "de minimis fringe,"
"eligible individual," "covered executive," "highly compensated participant,"
"qualified contaminated site," "eligible long-term care premiums," "permitted
insurance," "and qualifying child") that, upon definition, support and implement the
Code's normative provisions.215 Once an event or individual qualifies under the
212 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1208, 1221-1231 (West 2012).
213 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012).
214 White, supra note 29, at 1982 n.30: "grammar is what we use when we do not have
enough experience of a language to make it our own." Perhaps definitions, in turn, are what
we turn to when experience and use do not inform our understanding.
215 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 62 (West 2012) (adjusted gross income), 26 U.S.C.A. § 24(b)(1)
(West 2012) (modified adjusted gross income), 26 U.S.C.A. § 170 (West 2012) (qualified
appreciated stock), 26 U.S.C.A. § 168 (West 2012) (three-year and five-year property), 26
U.S.C.A. §197 (West 2012) (amortizable section 197 intangible), 26 U.S.C.A. § 132 (West
2012 ) (de minimis fringe), 26 U.S.C.A. § 25B (West 2012 ) (eligible individual), 26 U.S.C.A.
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definition, its tax treatment is (theoretically) settled. Usually, these terms are defined
by necessary and sufficient conditions. So, to be treated as "qualified medical
expenses," amounts must (i) be spent on medical care (as defined in the Code); (ii)
be paid on behalf of certain family members; and (iii) not be reimbursed.216 The fact
that unfamiliar and otherwise meaningless terms are used to establish a status that
brings with it entitlements or sanctions is likely a good thing. At least the
foreignness of the term ought to put the reader on notice that something unusual is
afoot.
Taxonomies relate categories of things to each other by identifying
characteristics that distinguish-or define-members of each category. Once an
individual is assigned to a category within a taxonomy, we know its attributes and
behaviors. As individuals or activities fall or fit within statutory definitions that
serve performative functions, we know their entitlements and obligations. What a
thing is will determine the statute's treatment of it. For these kinds of performative
definitions, what can we do as drafters and interpreters to ensure that those
definitions work as we expect them to? If we can identify characteristics of
successful speech acts and somehow incorporate those into legislative text, statutory
definitions might better perform their speech act roles.
Even if we wouldn't know what to call it, we recognize a speech act when we see
it (if we are observers) or experience it (if we are agents involved in it). We accept
that something is happening that changes the status quo. An individual is found to
be guilty by a jury and sentenced by a judge. That speech is performed in a
particular setting with rules and conventions by individuals vested with particular
authority. The individual upon whom the speech operates may not accept the truth
of what triggers the speech (much like a baseball player may not agree that the pitch
was a strike), but there is no evading the consequences of the speech.
Statutory definitions are parts of legislation enacted by authorized individuals
and then formally published in accordance with applicable rules. Together, the
authority of the speaker and the circumstances in which the speech occurs are
sufficient to make the legislative speech act possible. Whether that speech is
effective, though, depends on the intention and understandings of the parties. In
order for the speech's performative functions to be fulfilled, the speaker and its
audience must both understand that a particular speech has a recognized effect and
agree to be bound by whatever it is that the speech implies.217
In a statutory context, we want to ensure that the interpreters and those to whom
the statute applies are alerted to the performative nature of the definition. A reader
ought to recognize that by qualifying under the definition, consequences follow.
And, on each occasion that the defined term appears in the statute's text, interpreters
§ 125 (West 2012 ) (highly compensated participant), 26 U.S.C.A. § 198 (West 2012)(qualified contaminated site), 26 U.S.C.A. § 213 (West 2012) (eligible long-term care
premiums), and 26 U.S.C.A. § 220 (West 2012) (permitted insurance).
216 26 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(2) (West 2012).
217 See AusTIN, supra note 13, at 15. In enumerating the conditions that must be satisfied
in order for a speech act to be successful, Austin notes that the parties must be sincere in their
speech: "Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain
thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of
any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have
those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend to so conduct themselves."
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ought to be reminded of the importance of that defined term. Causing words of
ordinary meaning to serve speech act functions does nothing to highlight the special
role that they play in the statutory scheme. Better to define words and phrases with
little or no meaning if the fact of inclusion within or exclusion from the definition
triggers significant consequences.
Speech acts involve almost ritualized behaviors and language. In order to invest
a group of entities or states of affairs-a grouping that is otherwise not a familiar or
natural one-with attributes, perhaps a wholly new and invented term best serves to
highlight both the newness and uniqueness of the group created by statute. So, in a
regulatory regime which sanctions or rewards particular behaviors and where there is
no ordinary term to describe a group of qualifying instances, a wholly invented term
that is otherwise as close as possible to meaningless may be appropriate. This type
of group of instances would not exist apart from statute; to label this newly created
group by a word or phrase that does convey meaning and evoke connotations may
detract from the ritualistic character of the use of the term, and, in fact, interfere with
the term's function within the context of the statute.
If certain types of employees are entitled to rights not shared by all employees,
why not, instead of defining the term "employee" in a way that contradicts its
ordinary meaning, define a new term like "entitled employee"? Interpreters are put
on notice that every time that term appears in the statute, it designates a group that is
distinguished and treated in a particular way.
Most speech acts are simple and to the point. Statements like, "I now pronounce
you man and wife," "The jury finds the defendant not guilty," and "I baptize this
child," are clear in their import and impact. Definitions that are equally direct and
succinct are certainly easy to understand. If falling within the definition's scope
brings with it privileges or obligations, whatever it is that determines the definition's
application ought to be clearly stated (even if the application itself is not always
certain).
Too complex definitions invite technical avoidance and insincere compliance.
Speech acts are most effective when the participants recognize the speech's effect
and agree on the intentions motivating the speech. Drafting a definition that is long,
complicated, and full of exceptions facilitates purposeful misinterpretation of the
statute and frustrates the statute's purpose.
Just as some communications are infelicitous, so do some speech acts result in
unanticipated and unintended consequences.2"' What we characterize as a loophole
in a highly regulated area is often simply an opportunity for either (i) willful
avoidance of a too precise set of conditions that define a groups of instances on
which obligations are imposed, or (ii) insincere compliance with a rule that failed to
218 Austin's argument is that performative utterances are neither true nor false; instead, as
he puts it, they can be "unhappy" and they can fail. Id. at 14: "Besides the uttering of the
words of the so-called performative, a good many other things have as a general rule to be
right and to go right if we are to be said to have happily brought off our action. What these
are we may hope to discover by looking at and classifying types of cases in which something
goes wrong and the act-marrying, betting, christening or whatnot-is therefore at least to
some extent a failure: the utterance is, then, we may say, not indeed false but in general
unhappy."
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take into account all of its consequences.2" 9 The ability of actors to intentionally
move in and out of the confines of definitions depends not so much on the
interpretation of the definitional text, but, rather, on the tailoring of behavior by the
statute's audience to fall within or be excluded from the statute's scope. In some
cases, a shifting of behaviors is exactly what the statute encourages and, in fact,
fulfills its purpose;220 in others, though, purposefully avoiding the scope of a too
precisely worded definition frustrates the policies of the statute. An overly precise
definition informs bad actors by delineating means to avoid compliance. 22' A
definition stated in terms of a prototype that either identifies an exemplar or simply
states what characteristic it is that distinguishes the category may better clarify what
types of instances are to be included in the definition and be less likely to provide
instructions for willful misbehavior.
Finally, definitions that are too complicated fail to identify what it is that
distinguishes, from all other things, those instances that fit within the category
created by the definition. Performative speech is effective only to the extent that it
occurs in a consistent context and involves actors and activities that are in some way
similar. If a definition fails to articulate what its instances have in common, its
effects, when the statute's normative provisions are applied to those instances, may
make little sense.
To suggest that speech act definitions should clearly identify what characteristic
distinguishes the group of instances falling within the scope of a definition is very
different from a commitment to precision in definitions. The United States Code is
replete with definitions fulfilling performative roles that set forth long and complex
litanies of conditions that must be satisfied in order for an instance to fall within a
definition's scope. The definition of eligible contract participant in Title 7
(Agriculture) is more than one thousand words long.222 It sets forth fourteen
different types of individuals and entities that may qualify, under a variety of
circumstances unique to each particular type, as an eligible contract participant.
While that definition elaborates the scope of its application in purportedly precise
text, the extent of the definition's coverage is by no means clear or certain. Nowhere
in those one thousand words does one get a sense of what characterizes or what
should distinguish an eligible contract participant from all others. Instead, for more
than one of its fourteen types of qualifying individuals and entities, the definition
provides what Hickman and Hill might describe as a road map,22 3 a set of detailed
instructions that guide potentially qualifying instances toward a desired result,
whether that goal is to be deemed an eligible contract participant or not. Instances
could, depending on their interests, move within or without the scope of the
219 See, e.g., the description of the "SUV loophole" in Lawrence Zelenak, The Loophole
That Would Not Die: A Case Study in the Difficulty of Greening the Internal Revenue Code,
15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 469, 470-71 (2011).
220 See, e.g., supra note 121, the definition of "eligible solar, wind, waste or geothermal
facility" in 16 U.S.C.A. § 796(17)(E) (West 2012).
221 Hickman & Hill, supra note 180, at 1197.
122 7 U.S.C.A. § Ia (18) (West 2012).
223 Hickman & Hill, supra note 180, at 1187.
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definition. It is this type of performative definition that could lead to what Hickman
and Hill characterize as spirit violative behavior.224
Precision and clarity are different statutory goals. In a speech act context, when
objects, individuals, or states of affairs are invested with privileges or burdened with
obligations, when becoming a defined thing brings with it rights or sanctions, we
ought to know what it is about the thing that causes it to warrant such treatment.
Rather than a long and complex litany of conditions that must be the case in order to
qualify as a defined terms, better to simply and succinctly state what it is that makes
qualifying instances special.225 Speech act definitions confer power on those who
benefit from being included within the scope of the definition and on those who
enforce sanctions or obligations on qualifying instances. Definitions create
categories, and the treatment of category members must somehow be justified; why
this particular group of instances-and not others-warrant one approach-and
others another-ought to be relatively straight-forward and understandable, both to
those to whom the statutory definition applies and those who are called upon to
interpret it.
Too precisely articulating a definition impairs its ability to be applied sensibly in
states of affairs unanticipated at the time of the legislation's enactment. In a perfect
world, we would expect definitions that are "crisp enough to apply and.., flexible
enough to deal with new situations." '226 Dickerson suggests that, where needed,
definitions should "put sharp edges" '227 around the boundaries of a term. "Sharp
edges" may not always be the answer-too rigid an outline complicates application
in unforeseen circumstances, prevents normal maturation of meaning as context
changes, and weighs down a text, making it nearly unintelligible and lessening its
import. But surely the statutory definition ought to "sharply"-i.e., clearly and
succinctly-indicate what it is, given the policies and purposes behind the statute's
normative provisions, that should characterize those privileged or obligated
instances.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the temptation to define strikes, resistance should follow. Defining
without a valid and well-identified purpose risks complicating the statute and
creating the potential for unforeseen questions unrelated to the statute's purpose.
224 Id.
225 Or, as Hickman and Hill suggest, it may in some cases be appropriate to formulate
"goal-derived categories:"
The categories law uses are generally specified concretely at fairly low levels of
abstraction. Law is, after all, trying to guide action.... [T]he concrete specification
takes the form of prototype-centered categories or categories with necessary and
sufficient conditions. Both types of categories open the door to spirit-violative
behavior. Law therefore needs a way to reach what these lower level categories miss,
to realize fully the categories' purposes. Goal-derived categories are law's solution:
they represent a recourse to the higher-level abstraction that could not by itself be the
law but that, as a complement to more concrete prohibitions, fills in the gaps.
Id. at 1198.
226 SOLAN, supra note 11, at 13.
227 DIcKERSON, supra note 4, at 91-92.
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The legislative drafter should carefully consider what the definition is intended to
accomplish and how best to further those purposes.
If the statute is part of a complex scheme designed to order a sphere of activity,
where individuals-depending on their attributes and actions-are entitled to be
treated in particular ways, then assigning a name to those groups of actors might be
useful. If the drafter wants to ensure that particular instances are certainly and
forever entitled to particular treatment, no matter how the interpreter chooses to read
the text, then a definition can clarify an instance's status. For purposes of modeling
behaviors, a performative definition may fit the bill-if an instance falls or
purposefully comes within the scope of a definition, the named thing is treated
appropriately.
The drafter may see no other way to make her meaning and communication plain
other than by definition. She may be unsure whether a particular term will be
understood by her audience as she intends it to be. Or she may wish to forestall
anticipated misinterpretation. A definition can provide information and direction on
how a particular term is to be understood.
In relegating particular instances to a specified treatment, the definition functions
as a performative. In clarifying the sense of words in text, the definition's
predominant role is to enable successful communication. In either case, the benefits
of precisely defining a word or phrase that is already easily associated with a well-
accepted meaning are dubious. Articulating definitions of well-understood and
unambiguous terms may in fact be detrimental to both communicative and
performative goals. If the definition is performative in nature-if qualifying under it
invests an individual or activity with rights or obligations-the point is to put the
audience on notice. Defining words already having well-established meaning and
then asking them to perform speech act functions demands too much of them. And,
the audience may be frustrated as it is expected to invest common terms of ordinary
meaning with special powers.
If, on the other hand, the purpose of the definition is to strengthen or clarify a
legislative communication, defining a well-understood word risks not only
unintentionally changing its meaning, but fixing it in time. If the drafter intends a
word of ordinary meaning to have that ordinary meaning in the statute, why define it
at all? 228 Why diminish the nuances and complexities of meaning? If the drafters
wish to change a word's ordinary meaning through definition, to either expand or
restrict its compass, it may be better to use an invented or descriptive term instead.
Definition may be advisable, however, to clarify the intended meaning of
ambiguous 229 or unsettled terms or to establish groups of individuals or activities
entitled to particular treatment. No matter what purposes it serves, however, the
definition ought to be simple and succinct in its statement. Long and convoluted
228 Any time there is a discussion of a term's meaning, that meaning inevitably is changed.
Beardsley, supra note 82, at 5: "as soon as we talk about ordinary language we are changing
it. To point out an ambiguity in a term, or to call attention to different functions of a
syntactical device, is to force users of the language to be conscious of a distinction hitherto not
sharply made, and hence to force them to make new decisions in using the language."
229 Of course, sometimes Congress prefers ambiguity and purposefully chooses not to
clarify a term's meaning. See Elizabeth Garrett, Preferences, Law, and Default Rules, 122
HARv. L. REv. 2104, 2116 n.28 (2009) (review of EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT
RULES: How TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION (2008)).
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definitions seldom promote clarity or certainty, and they surely make a legislative
text more difficult to read, as repeated reference to the definition's details is required
throughout the reading of the statute.
No matter what she seeks to accomplish in defining a term, the legislative drafter
would do well to realize that definition is a process that is always incomplete. Word
meaning inevitably changes and unforeseen situations occur that are not addressed
by definitions purportedly covering all circumstances. Better to take into account the
indeterminacy of word meaning in drafting a definition than to attempt to completely
and finally memorialize the meaning of a term.
Regardless of the goal, the drafter ought not to confuse clarity, certainty, and
precision. The last does not always lead to the first or the second. While the
definition ought to be clear in its import-the reader should be able to understand
what instances are generally covered or what sense of the word is intended-it need
not be absolutely certain. The definition may leave open the question of whether
some outliers are encompassed within it. Or, it may, with certainty, include or
exclude particularly hard cases. But it need not do so by precisely and interminably
enumerating all of the characteristics of every qualifying or disqualified instance. To
try to do so would be both expensive, from a drafting perspective, and futile.23
Once a decision to define has been made, the drafter should consider whether the
most important function served by the definition is a communicative or performative
one.
If the definition's function is to improve the understandability of the legislative
text-if it is primarily a tool to ensure a successful communication between the
legislature and its audience-then the definition needs simply to replace what is lost
as a result of the sparse legislative context. The communicative definition ought to
enrich context by quickly disambiguating among competing senses, establishing a
shared frame of reference, and getting drafters and audience alike on the same page.
From a communication point of view, we want to avoid "definitional
inexorability.""23  The definition ought not to fixedly settle meaning; it ought to
simplify clarify the legislative intention. The drafter need not, by definition,
diminish the richness of meaning. Rather, for terms of many meanings, we want to
quickly identify what sense of the word is intended. The communicative definition
can also make clear that particular outlying instances are either included or excluded.
A list of included instances, accompanied by a catch-all phrase that draws into the
definition's scope similar instances, works well to replace what context and
interaction otherwise supply. Once the appropriate meaning is identified, the drafter
ought to stop there. The more that is said in the definition, the more baggage232 it
carries, purposefully or not. If particular features of a defined term are especially
important in the legislative context, the definition should highlight those aspects as a
way of focusing the interpreter's attention on those characteristics. If the drafter
recognizes that the term might be reasonably read to include unintended cases,
language that quickly eliminates those misinterpretations ought to be included. But
if the intended sense of the term is an especially narrow or broad one, the drafter
might consider appending an adjective to the term, and, then, defining that modified
term, to indicate the change in meaning.
230 Cooter & Ginsburg, supra note 158.
231 Schauer, supra note 90, at 512-13.
232 FILSON & STROKOFF, supra note 181.
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For definitions that serve performative functions, the stakes are somehow higher;
we may actually seek inexorability.233 Once an instance meets the definition's
criteria, it becomes something to which entitlements or sanctions attach; the
definition is in fact the tail that wags the dog. And, it may not be enough to merely
identify a particular sense of a term or include or exclude marginal cases.
Legislation that regulates a particular sphere of activity often includes definitions
that distinguish one group of actors or objects from others;... depending on which
definition applies, a particular treatment follows. The relationship among defined
terms informs a reader and may guide behavior in a way that furthers the statute's
policies. In drafting definitions that serve performative functions, legislators might
consider who it is that has the power to cause an instance to either come within a
definition's scope or be excluded from it. In encouraging particular behavior, some
statutes include definitions that allow instances to move within or outside of the
definition's scope by acts of will. These definitions serve as road maps, showing the
way to consumers to help them achieve a particular result. These types of
performative definitions are likely best expressed as a series of conditions that can be
satisfied by changes in behavior or actions. If the conditions are met, a particular
outcome is ensured.
If, on the other hand, the legislature has determined that an individual or instance
having particular characteristics, regardless of intention, merits a certain statutory
treatment, then the performative definition might simply state clearly and concisely
what it is that is essential-i.e., what one characteristic is emblematic of the types of
things that warrant a particular treatment.
Imposing a performative function on any term is to make that term something
other than what it ordinarily is. That argues against investing ordinary or frequently
used terms with performative powers. It requires a stretch of the intellect to define a
term like "child" so that it serves a speech act function; but asking a term like
'unaccompanied alien child" '35 (as strange as it may sound) to bring together a group
of children who are entitled to certain benefits seems far more reasonable.
The tail-wagging and non-barking dog goes a long way toward highlighting our
approach to and understanding of statutory definitions. On the one hand, definitions
do not bark particularly loudly-they do not draw attention to themselves, and,
consequently, we haven't carefully examined the roles they play in a reader's
understanding of a statutory text. On the other hand, it is sometimes the definition
that determines how and to whom the rights, privileges, and sanctions described in
the statute apply. Drafters and interpreters alike might benefit from paying more
attention to the dog that does not bark and to the tail that sometimes wags so that
terms are more appropriately defined, that definitions function as intended, and that
233 We may, in fact want to "box" both the governed and the interpreters "into a comer."
See Bhatia, supra note 182, at 137-38 (quoting Caldwell).
234 In a federal securities context, there are brokers and dealers, but there are also "persons
associated with a broker or dealer," "registered brokers or dealers," "municipal securities
dealers" and "municipal securities brokers," "persons associated with a municipal securities
dealer," "government securities dealers" and "government securities brokers," "persons
associated with a government securities broker or government securities dealer," "municipal
advisors," and "persons associated with a municipal advisor or associated person of an
advisor." See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77b, 78c, 78o-4 (West 2012).
235 6 U.S.C.A. § 279 (West 2012).
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the legislative audience's expectations with respect to terms used in a text are
respected.

